THE NEW REPUBLIC

Peaceful Engagement

How to Exploit Communist Disunity

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Trade—A Bold New Move?

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Packaging Bravery

★ We sat beside a couple of America's astronauts last week and tried to puzzle through a problem. Why does America try to debase and degrade its heroes? In intervals of patiently signing autographs for the dinner crowd the young men talked seriously and frankly. Donald Slayton had just been disqualified, and this was the traumatic aftermath. Authorities said Slayton's slight heart irregularity eliminated him from the next orbital flight.

If ever we saw dedicated men under terrible temptation it is these fliers. They are brave and fiercely patriotic – and fascinated by Space. Given half a chance they would be heroes exemplifying what we like to think best in the United States. Yet even before they get off the ground they are fouled with publicity.

If you want to study the perfect workings of American Bad Taste follow what has happened and what (we fear) is going to happen. One of them said sadly that on top of all the other strains of his position, there was this additional strain of adulation; it was a real pressure, he said. He would just like to be left in quiet till his flight was completed.

A knowing civilian promptly admonished him. "You forget your role for the public!" he expostulated. "They are identifying themselves with you. The whole nation is making the flight. You are boosting the morale of the entire country!"

You could see in the open face of the astronaut that he was accustomed to deferring to higher authority. He wasn't used to such problems. Apparently he dutifully accepted the judgment. We asked him gently about the pool deal with *Life* in which the fliers sold their advance personal story rights for $500,000. Wasn't this encouraging the publicity he questioned? . . . There wasn't any real answer. The deal was cooked up, it appeared, by the space agency public relations men down at Cape Canaveral. At the time it seemed to be a good idea.

These men are not boys; they are around 40, have wives and children, are picked for their stability and sense of proportion. In a terribly risky enterprise it is good to have their families taken care of. Furthermore, in a sense they are pawns of the State Department which wants to contrast American openness with Communist secrecy and thus singles them out before the flights occur.

And so now the pitiless American publicity machine has them in its grip; it is packaging loyalty and sloganizing bravery; it has taken honest and gallant men and is trying to cast them into a Hollywood mold; it is proving that patriotism not only is a good thing but pays, too, like religion! The Astronauts are investing their magazine money in an apartment house in Washington and a motel in Cape Canaveral, with who knows what profits. Maybe the Astronauts can escape the corruption that is in the very air but they are so alone and the forces against them are so gigantic.

Pin-ups and Baptists

★ The American Newspaper Guild's Heywood Broun Award this year gave honorable mention to the American-owned, European-based *Overseas Weekly* and but for a technicality might have made it the winner. This paper, which goes to 50,000 GI's in Germany and elsewhere, exposed Birchite Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker's efforts to indoctrinate young Americans – a political activity for which he was later admonished and transferred. For its exposure *Overseas Weekly* may be put out of business.

This brash little off-beat magazine is frankly published for young GI's, with a pin-up girl in front and back. It has cast in its lot with the enlisted man against the brass, and one doesn't have to accept its views to feel that it has fought for their interest within the limits of responsible journalism. Friends of General Walker, members of the John Birch Society, and the so-called *Dan Smoot Report*, however, call it subversive and demand that it either be suppressed or banned from newsstands of overseas military centers – which might be the same thing.

Last September Secretary McNamara told a Senate committee ambiguously that action was "under consideration." Defense Department witnesses before the Senate's committee investigating so-called muzzling of generals now say the inquiry is in progress in the European command. We don't know too much about the magazine but if it is "salacious" as angry Rightists charge, it seems odd 21 English-speaking Baptist churches in Europe reportedly advertise regularly. The Birchites also declare its exposure of Walker was "Communist-inspired," which doesn't impress us much either. In short, *Overseas Weekly* isn't the kind of a magazine that sedate old TRB would often use as a source reference on world affairs; but if he were a homesick young GI over in Frankfurt he would probably consider it just swell.

Notes

★ The new Dow-Jones Sunday newspaper, *The National Observer*, after a dull start, is getting brighter; the *NY Sunday Times* is so fat, and provincial weekly newspapers so poor, that the *Observer* may find a niche. . . . White House "neutrality" in the Massachusetts Teddy Kennedy-Eddie McCormack Senatorial primary race cause quips in Presidential circles: a very exalted one punned recently that in this war it might be better to be "Ted than Ed"; when asked if a Presidential invasion were contemplated he replied ambiguously that, if so, it would not be direct warfare but only a "training mission." . . . The Administration is now confident that it will get its health-aid-for-the-aged bill through this year. . . . And finally, we are sorry to see President Kennedy approve the round-about constitutional amendment route to kill poll taxes; we think it is a phony, and that the only practical approach is by direct Congressional prohibition.

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Satellites and Secrecy

The USSR, long skeptical about the purpose of our weather satellites, has accused the US of using them for military reconnaissance. This skepticism, doubtless reinforced by our Midas and Samos "spy" satellites, seems to have changed after a Soviet representative was invited to Washington and given access to the details of the weather satellite program, including a convincing demonstration that the large scale, wide angled photographs made by the satellites are not sharp enough to be used for military purposes. Subsequently, the Chief of the Weather Bureau, Dr. Francis W. Reichelderfer, told the House Space Subcommittee that the Soviets had recently expressed willingness to join with us in developing and operating a system of satellites that would facilitate long-range weather forecasting.

Then, last week, the text of President Kennedy's broad and imaginative letter of March 7 to Premier Khrushchev was released. One of the President's five proposals for common action in space was that there be a "joint establishment of an early operational weather satellite system . . . to provide global weather data for prompt use by any nation. To initiate this service, I propose that the US and the Soviet Union each launch a satellite to photograph cloud covers and provide other agreed meteorological services for all nations." The data they collect would be "disseminated through normal international meteorological channels." The President also welcomed Soviet cooperation in developing communications satellites.

One sign of Russian interest in communications satellites was the attendance of a nine-man delegation of Soviet scientists and engineers at the recent meeting of the International Radio Consultative Committee of the International Tele-Communications Union, the organization responsible for allocating the radio frequencies now used in communication. Vice President Johnson addressed the meeting and stated that the communications satellite program presented an opportunity for a "truly international cooperative adventure" that would substantially contribute to the "free flow and exchange, among all nations, of technological information."

But the nature of US intentions was put in doubt last week by a controversy involving the Pentagon. In a story appearing in the *New York Times*, John W. Finney reported that a new US satellite, Anna, has provoked a sharp controversy between the scientific community and the military. A joint project of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Anna will be launched within the next six weeks and will carry an

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intense blinking light to flash coded signals back to earth. The signals will permit scientists to determine, with a new degree of precision, the exact shape of the earth, and to carry out extremely accurate calculations of point to point distances along the earth's surface.

The Pentagon is insisting that the details of the project be secret, on the ground that the data would enable the Soviet Union to pinpoint the distances from Soviet launching sites to targets in the US. Scientists reply that these distances are already known to the accuracy required for guiding missiles. For example, the distance between North America and the Eurasian land mass is now known to an accuracy of plus or minus 55 yards. Moreover, the scientists maintain, Soviet intelligence experts could calculate the exact distances to points in the US by using information that is publicly available, such as the current geodetic maps of North America.

The scientific community, including the American Geophysical Union, wants to make the information about Anna and its code available to scientists everywhere. But the Pentagon holds that any information whatever about the satellite might be of potential military value to the Soviet Union. The argument has percolated upward through the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and finally reached the White House. The President pointedly omitted any reference to Anna in his proposals to Mr. Khrushchev.

The Pentagon case can scarcely bear up under the weight of scientific opinion, and politically it is the purest folly. If the US and the USSR are to achieve any degree of cooperation in space technology, we must be prepared to give some sign of trust – perhaps the first sign. The USSR, if one is to judge by the secrecy that surrounded the launching of its latest satellite (which first reports say was a weather satellite), is not inclined to give such a sign, and with some reason. After all, the US was the first to exploit space for military purposes; the development of our Midas and Samos satellites continues. If, almost immediately after proposing a constructive program of joint effort in space, we let one small quibble spoil it and classify data that is potentially of great value to scientists of all nations, our proposals will look like little more than propaganda gestures. When one considers that the military risks involved are of negligible importance, and that the scientific and possibly political gains at this relatively early and determinative stage of the space race remain promising, one finds little justification for the apparent vacillation of the White House. A decision to make the information on Anna available to the world seems unavoidable if the US means what it says about setting forth on a "truly international cooperative adventure."

The Mail Fraud

The increase in postage rates approved by the House, but not yet by the Senate, is wrong for many reasons. The very idea of making the Post Office Department a self-supporting business is wrong. It is not a business; it is a service, or should be. No other department of the government is even thought of as a business. Why then the Post Office?

The idea of raising rates on first- and second-class mail – especially for newspapers and magazines – is particularly objectionable. To begin with, first-class mail is not now in deficit at four cents an ounce. In London, the rate is three and a half cents an ounce, and there are *three* mail deliveries a day in residential areas. The only reason why US rates might be raised to five cents an ounce is that first-class mail users have no lobby and cannot object effectively.

The case of newspapers and magazines, however, is more critical. The imposition of an additional cent postage on every copy of a publication mailed outside the county is literally a matter of life or death, especially for those magazines whose advertising revenue is slight – that is, nearly every serious, smaller circulation publication. Mass circulation magazines distributed largely through newsstands rather than through the mails would be hurt least. If HR 7927 is not modified by the Senate (and it could be modified by basing postage rates primarily on the amount of advertising carried) postal charges paid by all magazines will rise by 40 percent (second-class rates have already gone up 89 percent in the last decade), and many of them will have to go out of business.

The real offender behind the scenes, and about which little if anything is proposed to be done, is third-class mail – the unsolicited advertising popularly known as "junk mail" or "sucker list" mail. Most of it is merely addressed to "Boxholder" or "Postal Patron." Some of it is sent out addressed directly to individuals from mailing lists which frequently get crossed up and deliver two or three copies of the same piece of mail to one individual in the same mail.

A lot of crocodile tears are shed at every Congressional hearing on mail over the plight of the small businessman who allegedly will go broke without this special, very low rate on advertising mail. The facts are that at least 97 percent of it is thrown away by the recipients. It is grossly unfair to load the cost of this mail on first-class mail, which is exactly what Congress may do. It would make better sense to require third-class mail to pay first-class rates. Why? Because it gets first-class service. Excluding parcel post (fourth-class mail) which is handled entirely separately, there is only one class of delivery for the other three classes of mail. Irrespective of how the three classes reach the post

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office of final destination, all three classes are turned over there to one route carrier for sorting and delivery.

This poor, overworked devil has to get to the post office by five a.m. There he receives bundles of all three classes of mail which include not only bona fide first-class mail (including air mail), newspapers and magazines, but also huge bundles of "junk." He may not leave any of the bulk rate mail for delivery tomorrow. It not only is against regulations but there is no room for it at the post office anyway. There will be an equally large mess of it the next day. The argument of the Post Office Department that third-class mail is handled during the slack hours of the afternoon is specious. All they do is bundle it for the route carrier to handle the next morning. There is really no such thing as "first class" mail anymore. It is all dragged down to the common denominator of the bulk mail – third class.

In the meantime, postal morale goes to the dogs because Congress insists on dealing with postal personnel as a special class of people and loading their wages on to the postal budget too. The fact is that postal personnel should be paid just like other classes of civil service personnel – out of a separate budget charged to general taxation.

The same should apply to all Congressional and other government mail. It should be charged to a general appropriation and not made a special burden of first- and second-class mail users. Nobody is arguing that Congress should not have all the mail it wants. But it ought to be paid for by separate appropriations – not out of postage funds.

If HR 7927 becomes law as it is now written, people are going to wake up one of these days with very few "first class" magazines or other reading material at their disposal. Most of those periodicals will have gone broke. And the price of mail service will keep going up and up as the junk mail mounts.

Knowing Consumers

How far our industrial society has moved from the principle of *caveat emptor* is shown anew by the President's message to Congress on consumer protection. "Many of the new products used every day in the home are highly complex," he points out. "The housewife is called upon to be an amateur electrician, mechanic, chemist, toxicologist, dietician and mathematician." Fraud becomes easier, and even in its absence, technical ignorance is an impediment to rational consumer choice. (The British have acknowledged this by inaugurating a TV program on BBC called "Choice," on which their two consumer testing organizations – carbon copies of similar organizations pioneered in the US – review consumer goods and appliances and say

Footnotes *to the* Week

Although Congress had authorized $1.5 billion for development loans during each of the first five years of the Kennedy "Decade of Development," the President asked for only $1.25 billion in his FOREIGN AID message last week. Lawyer Fowler Hamilton, director of the new Agency for International Development, is proving ineffectual; decisions are long-delayed on "controversial" pending loans.

After a study of two and one-half years, the Royal College of Physicians concludes that cigarettes are the most likely cause of the worldwide increase in deaths from LUNG CANCER; it asks the British Government to restrict tobacco ads, boost the cigarette tax, set up anti-smoking clinics, and notes that "between the ages of 35 and 55, the death rate in heavy cigarette smokers is three to four times that in non-smokers." Senator Neuberger is seeking the establishment here of a Presidential Commission on tobacco and health. *The STEERING COMMITTEE, set up by House Democrats, will do no steering and shape no policy. It is a gesture to "liberals," signifying nothing.* Featured speaker at a national United Negro College Fund rally in Pittsburgh, April 1, will be GEORGE ROMNEY, whose bona fides on civil rights have been called into question by political opponents because his Mormon faith bars Negroes from its priesthood. Romney ranked third (after Rockefeller and Goldwater) in a Gallup Poll of Republicans. But Democrats believe he will never get to Lansing, let alone Washington, pointing to campaign ammunition in his "sellout" last week to Old Guard Republicans on key provisions of the pending state Constitution. *The Administration denied having been pressed to grant a license for export of GRAIN TO CHINA, but officials privately admitted the Chinese, working through non-governmental groups, have put out feelers.* CHESTER BOWLES and Averell Harriman operated as a team during the Far East Regional Operations Conference of Ambassadors, military aid and intelligence officials last week in the Philippines. Bowles returns from his six-week tour warning of US complacency toward Afghanistan, where he found increasing Soviet influence. He addresses the National Press Club on March 23. *ON GENEVA: "To attempt to remove armaments before removing . . . substantive conflicts of interest is to put the cart before the horse. At every turn we are confronted with the fact that there is no way of evading those specific political problems – for the main part territorial questions of who is to rule whom, and where and when – in which all this tension and trouble has its real origins. Only when these are alleviated will the prospects for disarmament become real." (George F. Kennan, 1958.)*

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bluntly whether each item is worth buying.)

Mr. Kennedy proposes a variety of actions, both administrative and legislative, to safeguard the consumer and to help him purchase wisely in such areas as food and drugs, cosmetics, installment purchases, transportation and television. The major legislative actions requested include: a requirement that new drugs be proved effective as well as safe before they are placed on the market (a form of protection that hogs and cattle have had since 1913); control of prescription drug advertising directed to physicians; disclosure to borrowers of the actual amounts of rates of interest; support for pending legislation to require that television receivers be equipped for both UHF and VHF signals; and a provision for temporary cease and desist orders by the FTC against unfair competitive practices.

Behind several of these proposals are the extensive investigations by Congressional committees and executive agencies. Senator Kefauver has demonstrated the inadequacies of existing drug legislation and Senator Douglas has publicized abuses in the credit field, while the FCC has taken a close look at the narrowness of the television viewers' choice which results from using only VHF channels. While the President's remedies are not in every case exactly those advocated by the Senate investigators, they would work in the same direction and the message as a whole illustrates the best kind of legislative-executive cooperation in the development of new public policies.

Pay-As-You-See

Upholding the Federal Communications Commission's right to authorize a test of Pay-TV in Hartford, Conn. (Station WHCT), the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has said that the FCC may require a licensee to live up "to the high standard of programming which it has promised. To say the Commission cannot exercise supervision to that end would denude the [Pay-TV] experiment of its creative potentialities and dilute the Commission's power to make a final appraisal when the experiment is completed." The first Pay-TV station has thus been given a green light.

The price of programs will vary from 25 cents to $3.50, and there will be a rental charge for the "decoder" on each subscriber's set not to exceed 75 cents a week. WHCT has three years in which to prove whether the new system can sell itself. In the beginning, at least, the bulk of the programs will be first-run movies, though station spokesmen talk of offering art exhibits, ballets, opera and sports.

Anti-Pay-TV forces have won some sympathy from "liberals" with their argument that it would discriminate against low-income families. But would it be any worse than the cultural discrimination to which the poor are now subjected? Those who can't afford $1.25 to see the latest Broadway musical on their home set (or who don't get to New York) certainly can't afford $17.60 to purchase a pair of good seats to see it live.

Another network argument – it's really a threat – against pay television, is "that in order to compete successfully with Pay-TV, "free" television will be forced out of business. However, TV has become too indispensable a sales medium for advertisers to abandon the present sponsor-supported system. Networks will continue presenting Westerns, situation comedies and other comparable fare, while *Aida* direct from the stage of the Metropolitan or the Old Vic's production of *Lear* will be left to Pay-TV.

The networks also claim that if Pay-TV attracts large audiences, advertisers will be eager to pay for the opportunity to reach them. And so, in its effort to maintain this second source of income, the subscription service will become equally advertiser-dominated, presenting only the most popular and innocuous programs: the only difference will be that the home-viewer will have to pay for what he now gets free. This could happen, but it is unlikely. The Hartford station has assured the FCC that it will not sell time on Pay shows. In another area of broadcasting, the 60-odd educational stations currently in operation, sponsors are barred.

It cannot be denied that Pay-TV's expansion would incur some loss. Important sports events, most of which can now be viewed at home without charge, would almost all limit their TV coverage to subscription stations. The movie exhibitors' fears of Pay-TV, unlike the similar concerns of network executives, seem well grounded, though motion picture exhibitors shed no tears when vaudeville was killed off by the movies. (The producers, of course, see in pay television an opportunity to gross profits undreamed of in Hollywood's heyday.) Yet, if we are a free-choice society, each product and service should have the chance to prove itself to the public, even though it is known that others may suffer if it succeeds.

Shelters in Schools

How is one to interpret the fact that in New York State, a $100 million state authorization of civil defense matching funds has been reduced to a $5 million appropriation, because only two local school boards were actively interested in constructing fallout shelters, despite the fact that the schools have been directed to keep the children in school in the event of an attack. Does this unresponsiveness mean that if there is money to be spent, local communities feel that classrooms, playgrounds and teachers are more urgent needs than

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shelters? One suspects there are more subjective reasons. If shelters are built, their use would have to be explained. And since this would provoke questions, discussions would ensue on the nature and causes of a possible nuclear war. The belief that children thrive when they imagine themselves immortal would have to be abandoned. The taboo on discussing death in the classroom would be broken. And what parent cares to think of his child coming home from a day of paint and blocks, topped off by an hour of slides of Hiroshima. Of course children are not as innocent as parents hope, and a little inquiry suggests that many have quite sophisticated ideas about the horrors their parents' generation may have in store for them "if some fool presses the button." But parents would rather not admit this. And as long as they feel this way, school superintendents are not likely to rush into shelter construction, or begin readying children for the not-so-remote possibility that they will be prematurely called to make their peace with themselves and God.

ULBRICHT'S ANSWER TO FOOD SHORTAGES: EAT LESS, WORK MORE

Fewer and Fewer Potatoes

Bonn

Some kind of economic crisis is always being announced in the East German Republic. The year before last the head of the Council of State, Walter Ulbricht, had to modify his long-term Economic Plan. Last year, he had to admit serious lags in industrial production. This year, on March 9, he announced an agricultural "state of emergency" to 2,000 delegates at the seventh East German "farmers Congress" in Magdeburg.

The 1961 grain, potato and root crops were miserable. Typical was the potato crop, which totalled 9.2 million tons against 14.8 million tons in 1960. Instead of being an area of surplus, East Germany is importing potatoes from Poland, and East German citizens are urged to eat fewer potatoes and to substitute rissoles made of dried peas, soya-meal sausages and dumplings, and "super-snacks" of dried cabbage salad and chicory. State-owned collective farms have been reduced to advertising in the newspapers for seed potatoes; state-owned restaurants are to have four instead of two "potatoless" days each week.

There is a growing shortage of livestock, due to "black" slaughtering and to lack of fodder. According to the East German figures, the pig population dropped during the last three months of 1961 from 9,280,000 to 8,150,000. There are now barely two million head of cattle in the East German Republic. Here is the origin of the chronic shortage of fresh milk, which in some areas is being reserved for children under five.

There is a growing shortage of labor for agriculture. During the last two years all land has been either totally or partially nationalized (in the latter event, farmers are allowed to retain nominal ownership of some machinery and livestock, although not of the land itself). Many farmers are drifting into industry, since it is no longer possible for them to escape comparatively easily into West Berlin and so into the Federal Republic. The Communist regime has to issue instructions that no state credits will be granted to farms, unless all able-bodied members of the family work on the land. Morale is very low and grumbling endemic.

In Magdeburg, Ulbricht confirmed that less than 50 percent of the "total" collectives (in which the members are landless men who own no machinery or livestock) are working at a profit. There are 6,538 of these total collectives, and about 12,000 others which, again according to Ulbricht, are riddled with flaws too. In the so-called lowest class of collective, the members can retain one acre for their personal use; as a result, they spend a disproportionate amount of time looking after this plot of land.

The whole collectivization program has been a failure so far. It has led to indirect rationing, in which householders have to register their names with a single butcher, baker, and grocer and can buy only a fixed amount of each foodstuff. It has led to the periodic unavailability of basic foodstuffs and to the use of "substitutes" (cheese made from skimmed milk in place of butter is one example). It has not produced starvation or even near-starvation, but the East Germans must live on a dull and restricted diet, and articles such as lemons, chocolate or coffee are luxuries.

It might have been thought that the Magdeburg Congress would produce some relaxation of restrictions, in order to spur farm output. Instead, Ulbricht says that total collectivization will be pushed harder – so that farmers will no longer have the "temptation" to spend overmuch time on their one-acre plots, or any "illusory" belief that the collectivization program may

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one day be reversed. Members of the ruling Socialist Unity (Communist) Party are to take over effective control of all collective farms; political party hacks are to take the places of men with some inbred understanding of the land, on the grounds that this will secure "maximum coordination" between the State and the farmers.

Finally, Ulbricht intends to organize a "shock program" by forcing large numbers of members of the Communist "Free" German Youth organization to work on the land, to sow and harvest the potato, maize and sugar beet crops. The first step will be the registering of all members of the "Free" German Youth organization who have recently left the land, and their redirection to agricultural work.

There will be periodic inspections of food stocks held by individual families and a strict "means test" imposed before members of collectives are paid their wages and before their collectives are granted credits for the purchase of seed and implements. In human terms, life on the land in Eastern Germany is going to be made even more intolerable than it was before.

In the past, false prophets have predicted an imminent and total collapse of the East German economy. It has never happened. In spite of heartbreaking and avoidable setbacks, the economy has been able to limp along. But this time Ulbricht is taking more serious risks than at any moment during the last 10 years. Mao Tse-tung's food-production plan in China has run into trouble. The Soviet Union is in difficulties too. Mr. Khrushchev has recently admitted shortfalls of 12 percent in grain production in 1961, 14 percent in milk and 24 percent in meat. According to Khrushchev, again, there are only 1,160,000 tractors in the Soviet Union, against a requirement of 2,690,000; and there has been a signal failure to raise output of fertilizers.

This has a direct bearing on the situation in the East German Republic. Ulbricht has just announced the promise of a 1,300 million mark loan from the Soviet Union for the purchase of foodstuffs and raw materials. But where are the foodstuffs to come from?

TERENCE PRITTIE

PROFILE OF THE PREMIER DESIGNATE OF AN INDEPENDENT ALGERIA

Ben Youssef ben Khedda

Paris

One night in July, 1957, when General Massu's paratroops were in the last stages of crushing rebel terrorism in Algiers, a man of less than average height, bearded and in dark glasses – a Spaniard or a Maltese one would have said – was alerted by his guard. Still in his pajamas, he fled out across terraces and over rooftops and disappeared. Such was the last departure from Algiers of Ben Youssef ben Khedda, then a key terrorist commander and now head of the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* (GPRA).

Now that a cease-fire has been signed by Paris and the GPRA, leaving only the Secret Army to be pacified, ben Khedda will soon be back in the city of his revolutionary baptism. This time he will not have to distinguish himself. His life will still be in danger, but this time he will enjoy the protection of French security forces, such as it is. Installed in the modern structure that now houses the Delegate-General instead of hideouts that had to be changed every few days, ben Khedda's mind will turn to Algeria's economic and administrative problems, and to foreign policy, instead of to setting up terrorist networks. He and his associates will be the chiefs of the Algeria of tomorrow.

Ben Youssef ben Khedda was born to a moderately prosperous family in the town of Berrouaghia, just south of Algiers, in 1920. He is thus of the generation which has given the Algerian revolution its most important leaders, the generation following – ideologically as well as chronologically – that of Ferhat Abbas, who with what he represented, was replaced at the head of the Algerian independence movement last August. Whereas Abbas was a moderate, ben Khedda and his contemporaries are radicals, distrustful of political parties and democracy in the Western sense, and firmly convinced that the anti-imperialist revolution is only the first step toward the social revolution.

The personalities of ben Khedda and Ferhat Abbas reflect the individual and historical divide that separates them. Abbas is expansive, loquacious, flexible, a verbalizer, a reformer. Ben Khedda is a reincarnation of Malraux' portrait of Michael Borodine in *Les Conquerants*. He is a *dur*, a revolutionary by faith, a man of amazing physical courage and resistance, always the complete master of himself. He listens rather than

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speaks, and when he does speak every word is weighed. He is an intellectual of Marxist formation for whom ideas and actions could not remain separate. This explains the paradoxical image of the bookish ben Khedda directing a bomb-throwing network.

The crisp shot out of the night which is politics, as Stendhal described it, hit ben Khedda while he was a student at the *lycee* at Blida. At 12, he was already scribbling "*République Algérienne*" on walls. At Blida he was the fellow student of Mohammed Yazid, the present GPRA Minister of Information, and of Saad Dahlab, the present Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the Université d'Alger, he studied pharmacy, as did Abbas. But unlike Abbas, who as a student leader over a decade before had ardently defended Franco-Moslem cooperation, ben Khedda immediately gravitated to the most extreme nationalist party of the time, Messali Hadj's *Parti Populaire Algérien*. His student political activity merited him a prison term in 1943, but he resumed his militant activity directly after his release. Completing his studies, he decided to abandon pharmacy and devote himself to politics and political journalism. At 26, his abilities as an organizer and theoretician led him to the post of Secretary-General of the *Mouvement Pour Le Triomphe des Libertés Democratiques*, the successor to the banned *Parti Populaire*.

During the next eight years he continued as a member of *Mouvement's* central committee and as the author of party propaganda. He was not known as an extremist, nor indeed was the faction of the *Mouvement* to which he belonged. On the contrary, when his faction broke out in open revolt against the increasingly tyrannical Messali Hadj (the bearded, charismatic father of modern Algerian nationalism), ben Khedda was singled out and berated as a "reformist" for his "willingness to compromise." Ben Khedda's faction favored cooperation with the liberal European mayor of Algiers at the time, Jacques Chevallier.

Suddenly in 1954, as if from nowhere, an appeal for unity and armed insurrection was sounded. Those responsible, for the most part scarcely known in Algiers, were former members of the underground wing of the MTLD. They were resolved to move forward at any cost. Their goal was to destroy the system rather than reform it. Their means were direct military action. This was the genesis of the FLN. During the summer of '54 this group, directed by nine men now known as the rebellion's *chefs historiques* and including such figures as Ahmed ben Bella and Belkacem Krim, was busy training guerrilla bands, stealing and storing arms, and searching for support from the independent Arab states. By early fall, ready or not, the group had fixed a date for the *déclenchement* of the revolution. At midnight on November 1 – it was All Saints Day – 70 simultaneous attacks on French posts in widely scattered parts of Algeria set off a war that only now may be coming to an end – eight years later.

The French authorities were astounded; they had been expecting nothing of the kind. Nor, however, had most of Algeria's Moslem politicians. Ben Khedda's wing of the MTLD had got wind of what was afoot, but viewed the resort to armed insurrection with the gravest misgivings. In the mind of the future GPRA prime minister, the revolt was premature, ill-planned, destined to fail.

"Peace and Harmony"

Having next to no idea who the organizers of the revolution were, the French Administration struck blindly. Moslem politicians and leaders were arrested who were as ignorant of the revolt's nature as they were innocent of participation in it. For the second time ben Khedda was put behind bars. Yet on November 25, the day of his arrest, ben Khedda, while complaining of French repression in the columns of *Alger Républicain*, asserted the need for "future peace and harmony between the two communities that must necessarily live together." He was at that moment by no means a disciple of direct action. In April, 1955, he was released from prison, probably through the influence of former European associates in Algiers.

Prison, or the crumbling of any middle ground in Algerian politics, or probably a combination of the two, drove ben Khedda toward the FLN, and shortly after his release he was in close contact with Belkacem Krim and other guerrilla leaders. His first responsibility for the revolutionary organization was the FLN cells in Algiers. These cells were charged with collecting funds, either by appeals to nationalist enthusiasm or by the threat of assassination; they were to develop the political consciousness of the masses and to channel this into blind loyalty to the FLN; and finally, they were to spread terrorism, sometimes indiscriminate, sometimes not, to increase tension and insecurity, demonstrate to the Moslem population the impotence of the French, and to draw French Army units from the *bled* in order to give the FLN field units a breather.

Before long ben Khedda was an equal of the rebellion's founders. His new status was officially recognized at a congress of rebel leaders held in an abandoned forestry station in the Soumman Valley – a zone officially declared pacified by the French military authorities – in August, 1956. This congress elected an executive committee of five members which was the nucleus of power within the FLN for the next two years. Though theoretically responsible to the *Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne* (CNRA), the FLN's parliament, the executive committee was in fact sovereign. Along with Krim, Saad Dahlab and two

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FLN leaders since killed, ben Khedda served on this committee for slightly over a year.

As the FLN's politico-military chief for the autonomous zone of Algiers, one of the six rebel military districts and the most active, ben Khedda lived under the constant threat of a death likely to be preceded by torture. Only a man who believed more in ends than in means could have organized the placing of time bombs in stadiums and streetcars and other public places where sheer chance selected the victims. He believed that blind terrorism was one of the most effective weapons in the FLN arsenal.

One interesting and little known phase of his career as FLN chief in Algiers is his contact during this period with the Communists. Early in 1956, when it seemed that peace negotiations with the French were on the verge of starting, the *Parti Communiste Algérien* (PCA) was searching desperately for a way to attach itself to the revolution and thus become a "valid interlocutor"; that is, to have a voice in the peace talks and a decisive role in determining Algeria's future. Up to May, 1956, the FLN had refused all contact with the Communists. By then, however, the rebels needed all the help they could get and were anxious to see how the PCA might be useful. The Communist Party chief, Dr. Saddock Hadjeres, proposed in secret negotiations with FLN representatives that the FLN, already representing several groups, be enlarged to include the PCA. Ben Khedda, who was instrumental in conducting these negotiations, not only rejected a common front, but even maintained that individual membership in the PCA was incompatible with membership in the FLN. By July, 1956, after the PCA had turned over to the FLN an important shipment of stolen arms and the use of its explosive laboratories, ben Khedda's position softened. While still rejecting a common front, he permitted individual Communists to join the FLN. For propaganda reasons Dr. Hadjares was extremely anxious to publish this accord so as to show the Algerian masses that the PCA had at least something to do with the revolt. Ben Khedda refused, and when Hadjares went ahead anyhow, the FLN flatly denied the authenticity of the accord, even going so far as to assert that the FLN had never received any aid whatsoever from the Communists. Since then, relations between the PCA and the FLN have been cool.

Neutralism Not Communism

The incident is instructive, especially since it has been so glibly asserted in the French press that the GPRA chief is a crypto-Communist. Ben Khedda is no Communist, but as these events show, he has been willing to use the Communists for his own ends. What he has fought for with so much energy, courage and ruthlessness is an independent and socially modernized Algeria, and if, on a trip to Red China, he seemed enthusiastic about what he saw, it meant more than anything else that at the time – when substantial Chinese aid to the rebels seemed imminent – it was useful for ben Khedda to appear enthusiastic.

But if ben Khedda is no Communist, he is certainly a *progressiste*, strongly influenced by socialist ideals and Marxist thought. In September, 1957, the *Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne*, assembled in Tripoli, heard him defend the theses according to which the FLN should devote more attention to the mobilization and organization of the peasant and urban masses, that the precise social goals of the revolution should be stated and stressed, and that the FLN should adopt a policy of neutralism in international affairs. From this line ben Khedda has not since varied. However, the CNRA was not at that point prepared to accept such radical views, partly due to the domination of more conservative elements, but also partly because the CNRA leaders, believing negotiations were in sight, were hesitant to arouse further French distrust. As a result, ben Khedda (along with Saad Dahlab, one of the chief negotiators in the present talks) was replaced on the CNRA's executive committee by Ferhat Abbas, the man most likely to succeed at the bargaining table.

For the next four years, ben Khedda's *progressiste* faction of the FLN was in the minority and ben Khedda himself was without a position of particular importance. In the first provisional government, established in September, 1958, and headed by Abbas, ben Khedda had to settle for the minor portfolio of social affairs, and it was in this capacity that he was the official guest of Mao Tse-tung. At the third session of the CNRA, ben Khedda again defended his *progressiste* positions and again found himself in the minority. This time he lost his ministerial post and was relegated to that of roving ambassador for the GPRA. As such he visited Yugoslavia, came to New York to defend the FLN's brief before the United Nations, and made a propaganda tour of Latin America where he was unpleasantly impressed by the prevalence of "US neo-colonialism."

At the CNRA meeting held in secret last August in Tripoli, ben Khedda again defended the views to which he had so tenaciously clung. During the year that had elapsed, three open attempts at negotiations with France had proved futile, and the Abbas ministry had inevitably lost prestige with the CNRA. This, linked with the general radicalization of the FLN – which, like most revolutionary movements had tended to go left as the violence had gone on – brought the CNRA around to supporting ben Khedda. Abbas and his close political allies resigned and ben Khedda, with the powerful support of Krim, rose to the premiership.

The communique of the Tripoli session, despite its

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vagueness, reflects the ideas that ben Khedda had expressed ever since his entry into the FLN. The following two points of the text distributed immediately after the meeting, plainly show this: "On the exterior, decisions have been taken to extend the action of the Algerian revolution, which manifest themselves in a policy of non-alignment.

"The CNRA has specified the social and democratic content of the Algerian people's struggle. Its aspirations tend toward the construction of a modern nation, [and] an economy at the service of the people." The same attitude is reflected in the message ben Khedda sent to Chou En-lai during the second half of February of this year. "We are fully conscious," he wrote, "of the difficulties and the size of the struggle that remains for us against the forces of neo-colonialism and imperialism, and for the consolidation of our independence and our economic and social liberty."

How the leftism of ben Khedda and his political allies will now be translated into concrete action remains to be seen. But it would be surprising if the Algeria to which ben Khedda will return does not eventually look more like Egypt or Ghana than like Nigeria or the Ivory Coast. Richard Mathews

Testing–What Does Kennedy Mean?

by James R. Newman

For the past week I have been examining the text of the President's March 2 speech on the resumption of testing. This has not been an exhilarating exercise, but I was moved to it for several reasons. That the decision to resume testing is iniquitous is perfectly clear to me, but I had to settle for myself the question whether Kennedy's arguments are in fact as confused as they sounded on delivery. Second, while I have in recent years become quite accustomed to large sections of the press exhorting Americans, in the name of survival, to join hands, close ranks, lock elbows, and march bravely off the edge of the cliff, I was appalled at the uniformly self-righteous and self-congratulatory tone of ensuing editorial opinion. And, third, I had to try to make sense of the spate of news "analyses," both before and after the event, which repeatedly emphasized the President's "agony" and "anguish" in making his decision.

Regarding this last piece of blather, may I say at once that it never occurred to me, nor, I suppose, to anyone else who is not completely demented, that Kennedy is a monster. He may not, to adopt a phrase of the late Sir Lewis Namier, have conspicuous capacity to imagine the past and remember the future; he may be too immersed in the stir and bustle of the present to have adequate perspective; but he is a man like other men, not unmindful of his humanity, no stranger to sympathy. It would not have crossed my mind that he could make a decision which is likely in the long run to cost thousands of lives, to spawn widespread disease and suffering, to mutilate future generations of children, and certain to deepen the despair and darken the hopes of mankind for peace – that he could take such a step without sorrow and inner conflict. One requires no instruction on this point by pundits or publicists. Prick the President and he will bleed; no doubt. Observe, however, that this is a necessary but not a sufficient qualification of leadership.

To return to the speech: careful scrutiny exposes it as a low yield device. It rolls, rumbles and reverberates; the crackerjack, the potted phrases, the humble supplications, the mood words, the organ tones: all are here. "Mortal hands," "Free World," "awesome responsibilities," "prevent the nuclear arms race from mushrooming out of control," "hope and prayer that these grim unwelcome tests will never have to be made," and so on. But comb out the fustian and what remains? What did Kennedy say that he has not said before? What fresh thought did he contribute? What light did he focus on dark questions? That he spoke truths is clear; and truth is always welcome. But truth can be misused, made the stalking horse to error; and one detects a collapse of reason between the worthy premise that the "world [must] be made safe for mankind," and the bizarre conclusion that this is to be accomplished by making bigger battle axes and trying them out on the necks of anonymous innocents.

I am not disposed to burden you with a minute content analysis of the President's speech, but a few samples may be permitted.

The main argument, of course, is that the US must

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maintain an effective quantity and quality of nuclear weapons to deter "a nuclear strike, or an overwhelming ground attack upon our forces and allies." Kennedy accepts this without question. Many persons agree with him, many do not. This is not a self-evident truth, no more than it is self-evident, say, that the death penalty deters murder. The President gives no sign that he appreciates even the possibility of a doubt as to the effectiveness of terror in preventing terror. One would feel more secure if one thought he had misgivings about this thesis.

Revenge, Not Prevention

There is an even more serious point to be considered in connection with the deterrence philosophy. Deterrence is, at best, a primitive, muddled concept, confusing alike to those who swear by it and those who repudiate it. I propose an analogy. What is a parachute tester? A man who tests parachutes? No. He is a man on whom parachutes are tested. Consider: if the parachute opens during the test his services are in a sense unnecessary; if the parachute does not open he is dead. And so, roughly, with deterrents. For these are devices to be tried out *on* us, not *for* us; of unknown value when unused, and useless when used. No wonder, therefore, that when men purport to argue for weapons which will prevent war, they end inevitably with a passionate plea for weapons which will make war more terrible. Here, at least, one is on safe ground; revenge, not prevention. Again and again Kennedy betrays his confusion on this score.

Take the second paragraph of his speech: The US, he says, must have weapons "so deployed and protected as to be capable of surviving any surprise attack [who is to survive, we, or the weapons?] and devastating the attacker." What has this to do with deterrence? The next sentence pretends to answer: "Only through such strength can we be certain of deterring a nuclear strike. . . ." But the sentence after that tips the President's hand: "Only through such strength can we in the Free world – *should the deterrent fail* [my italics] – face the tragedy of another war with any hope of survival." What does this mean? We deter or we do not deter. If we fail to deter, how can deterrent weapons help us to survive? They may help a dying country to destroy its assassin, a thought to comfort us on our exit, but they have even less to do with survival than the Administration's puny shelter program.

More in the same vein: "Were we to stand still while the Soviets surpassed us – or even appeared to surpass us – the Free World's ability to deter, to survive and to respond to an all-out attack would be seriously weakened." What has our "deterrent" to do with the Soviets' ability to attack us? What has a "deterrent" to do with responding to an attack? What has a "deterrent" to do with the fact that the Soviets "appear to surpass us"? Indeed, what does the word "appear" signify in this context? "Appear" to whom? To us? To the Soviets? To the Basques? What is the President talking about?

Next item. "Our friends around the world," says Kennedy, "know we are not deciding to test for political or psychological reasons. . . ." Can he be serious? We are testing, according to Kennedy, to acquire information which will enable us to improve our weapons so that they can "penetrate" the Soviets' antimissile system (assuming they have one), and "to achieve such a system for ourselves" (assuming this is possible). Are we planning to attack the Soviets? We are not. Our "peaceful intentions are clear." We are merely defending ourselves against the danger of Russian attack. Why then do we need missiles to "penetrate" their defense system? The answer is that the Russians must be made to understand that if they wallop us we will wallop them right back. Our deterrent must, as Kennedy said, be "credible." The Soviets must be persuaded that we can in fact match deed to threat. We must, in short, bring them to their senses. They must either agree to our terms at the next Geneva disarmament conference, or come round after we have impressed them with our determination and our nuclear proficiency. But what is involved in this persuasion other than a mixture of politics and psychology? Deterrence is to a cold war what slaughter is to a hot war: a continuation, if I may quote a quaint adage, of politics by other means. Kennedy knows this; we know it; the Soviets know it; also everyone knows that everyone else knows it. Whom is the President fooling?

One further point. The tests we threaten to carry out are described by Kennedy in almost ecstatic terms: they will "restrict the radioactive fallout to an absolute minimum, far less than the contamination created by last fall's Soviet series. Moreover, we will hold the increase in radiation in the Northern Hemisphere, where nearly all such fallout will occur, to a very low level." (I hear a noise behind the arras, which sounds like the father of some bomb or other.) The recent Soviet tests surprised the scientists, because of the remarkably low incidence of fallout. It may be, as the President says, that our tests will improve on this. Yet there will be fallout, which will add to the radiation to which men are exposed; and, as leading geneticists have made irrefutably clear, *any* increase augments the mutation rate, which in turn leads to deaths, stillbirths, malformations, disease. From this statistical fact there is no escape, though there are some who regard the bill as of small moment since the bulk of the payments will be deferred.

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To claim that, because US tests will be held over "the open sea," they will "rule out any problem of fallout in the immediate area of testing," thus implying that the Soviet tests, which were conducted in the Arctic, created just such a problem, is disingenuous. Leaving aside questions of amount, altitude of shots or wind and weather conditions, fallout over Novaya Zemlaya is no different from fallout over Christmas Island. No one supposes that tests have been or will be conducted over populated places. Moreover, as Kennedy knows, fallout over the test area itself is only part of the story. Radioactive debris spreads and circulates in time over an enormous area, and these secondary effects raise many difficulties and dangerous health problems imperfectly understood and impossible to solve.

Nor does the fact that our tests will take place over the Pacific – a soothing name – make them more peaceful than tests conducted over the Arctic. The truth is simple: the Soviet tests were immoral; ours are immoral; neither promotes life; both promote its extinction.

As for Kennedy's statements that he finds it "deeply regrettable" that any radioactive material must be added to the atmosphere, "that even one additional individual's health may be risked in the foreseeable future"; and that, "however remote and infinitesimal those hazards are judged to be, I still exceedingly regret the necessity of balancing these hazards against the hazards to hundreds of millions of lives which would be created by any decline in our nuclear strength" – these are examples of bathos. "This hurts me more than it hurts you," may be suitable sentiment for father when he punishes his son with a strap; but Kennedy is not my father, not the father of his country, let alone the father of mankind. I am not moved by his "regrets"; I regard them as an inadequate solatium for the poisoning of the air. Instead of oratory about human freedom and decency, I suggest that if we want to do something to promote peace we begin by being peaceful.

A Policy of Peaceful Engagement

How We Can Profit from Communist Disunity

by Zbigniew Brzezinski

The purpose of containment was to prevent Soviet expansion; the purpose of liberation was to roll back Communist frontiers. These policies have ceased to be relevant. Both were based on the premise that there is a united Soviet bloc. In the Sixties, however, the unity of the Communist camp is strained by the increasingly open Sino-Soviet dispute. In recent days the Poles have taken the unprecedented step of republishing a secret speech delivered by Luigi Longo in December, 1960, in Moscow, during which Longo charged the Chinese with "slanderous" attacks on Khrushchev; and Suslov, writing in *Kommunist*, has labeled support for the Albanians as "alien to the spirit of Leninism." The escalation of the Sino-Soviet dispute is evident.

From a defense point of view, one can perhaps still speak of a "bloc" in the sense that an attack by the "imperialist enemy" on any one member of the bloc would provoke ultimately a reaction from the others. But offensively, it is no longer a bloc. Rather, there are two constellations within it: the Soviet Union and the East European states, and the Chinese-Albanian alignment – supported on some issues by the North Koreans and North Vietnamese, although these last two parties prefer to maintain a neutral position insofar as the Sino-Soviet breach is concerned.

From the standpoint of Western policy, it is dangerous to assume that the internal conflicts of the Communist world will necessarily lead to a relaxation in international tensions. The short-range consequence of a Sino-Soviet split might be to intensify Soviet tendencies to unilateral, go-it-alone behavior. If an open split takes place it will presumably involve mutual accusations, and the Soviets will be charged by the Chinese with excessive moderation. The split will produce factional struggles in most of the Communist parties,

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and the Soviet leadership may find it necessary to demonstrate its revolutionary primacy by adopting a more rigid and violent policy towards the West. Indeed, it could be argued that as long as the two parties are linked by a relationship of divergent unity, the Chinese articulate more radical policies than those that they actually pursue, and the Soviets more moderate ones, in order to influence each other. A split might produce, at least in its immediate wake, greater Soviet militance and, conversely, greater Chinese moderation. The short-range consequence could thus be an intensification of world tensions. Nonetheless, the long-range consequences of a split are bound to be advantageous to the West, and might break the backbone of international Communism and shatter its sense of inevitable triumph.

Secondly, it is always important to remember that Soviet inclination to placate Washington rather than Peking is very much dependent on the Soviet assessment of the existing balance of forces, particularly of the American capacity to deal punishing blows to the Soviet Union in case of war. If the recent Soviet nuclear tests were to give the Soviet Union relative invulnerability from an American nuclear strike, it is quite likely that the Soviet leadership would be very much tempted to adopt a more aggressive policy towards the West, thereby closing the breach with the Chinese. Thus a situation of relative invulnerability from an American attack, with America still more or less vulnerable to Soviet missiles, would be a most unstable one. It would give the Soviet leadership every reason to favor more militant policies in hope of reunifying international Communism.

It follows from the preceding that it would be hazardous to make concessions to Khrushchev on the assumption that he is to be preferred to other, possibly more militant Communist leaders. The paradox of the present situation is that concessions to Khrushchev weaken his argument with Mao by seemingly proving Mao's proposition that the West will yield if pushed hard enough. If the West had not been firm with Khrushchev in the past, it would have weakened his arguments and would have provided him with no impetus for risking an open break with the more militant Communists. As long as we remain credibly committed to fighting the Soviet Union whenever the Soviet Union attacks our vital interests, we give the Soviet leaders the survival-inducement to take chances even with Communist unity. The Soviet leadership would prefer to have both Communist unity and peaceful victories. Our policy of firmness forces it to choose between the two, and, indeed, it may result in denying both objectives to it. Accordingly, it is essential that firmness, and a willingness to take even a high degree of risk, should continue to characterize Western policy.

It is also misleading to assume that Khrushchev's fall from power would result in his being replaced by a Stalinist successor. The changes that have taken place in Russia since Stalin's death are very profound and Stalinism as a form of government is most unlikely to return. Indeed, Khrushchev, the innovator who had broken with Stalinism, is himself increasingly being challenged by a younger group of leaders who are beginning to view him as a man still tarnished with the Stalinist past. These younger leaders are not "Western-type liberals" in any sense of those words. They do, however, want a rational, efficient, highly centralized and modern Soviet system, which can mobilize popular support and initiative from below without yielding to it any degree of authority and policy making. These leaders come from a post-Stalinist generation and it is among them that a struggle for succession is likely to take place if Khrushchev suddenly dies or is removed. Furthermore, his removal at this time would probably be followed by a most debilitating struggle for power, given Soviet domestic dilemmas as well as the existing problems within international Communism. In fact, these could come together and could result in bitter clashes, with many Communist parties from the outside participating for the first time in the internal resolution of Soviet politics. Soviet foreign policy would remain paralyzed for a long period, while the long-range consequences of such a struggle could be of far-reaching significance and could perhaps involve profound changes in the nature of that system.

In view of all this, it is very important that the policies we adopt towards the Soviet Union and the bloc encourage neither excessive militancy, nor optimism on the part of the various Communist leaderships, nor through excessive rigidity and hostility reverse some of the desirable trends already noted, both within the bloc and the Soviet Union itself. Since the Communist world has become very differentiated, it is extremely important that Western responses also differentiate between the various Communist countries. The policy of differentiated amity and hostility must have as its purpose to consolidate differences within the Communist world, to promote those trends which we view as desirable, and to discourage those which are dangerous to us. Specifically, I would recommend the following:

1 – While maintaining firmness and yielding nowhere to Soviet pressure, it is desirable at present to adopt a policy of fraternization on the basis of firmness with the Soviet leaders. Exchanges of personal visits, common appearances on television, at some point even good will visits of heads of state, can all contribute to further differences within the Communist world, so long as they do not lead to substantive con-

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cessions on our part. Indeed, so long as the West is firm in not yielding to Communist pressure, there is no reason why the West could not be the initiator of such contacts and exchanges. The option of whether to accept such invitations would be up to the Soviets, who would then be torn by conflicting desires. Frustrated by our unwillingness to yield, but unwilling to take risks because of the consequences of a war, the Soviet leadership might be tempted to accept such contacts in the hope of eventually wearing down Western determination. This calculation has to be considered and weighed seriously, but on the whole the advantages of such undertakings might well outweigh the disadvantages, provided that Western leadership succeeds in communicating to their own people the necessity both of firmness and of limited fraternization. In the meantime, the more militant Communist elites would be outraged by such Soviet-American contacts and this would further aggravate their relations with Moscow.

2 – The application of the policy of differentiated amity and hostility to China would involve, in the present phase at least, the continued ostracism of the Chinese. American isolation of China is desirable as long as the Chinese continue their bitter ideological quarrel with the Soviets within the framework of *pro forma* unity. Intense Chinese Communist hostility to America feeds back into the Sino-Soviet relationship and strains it. The American willingness to repel by force Chinese aggression in Quemoy and Matsu in 1958, undertaken against Soviet advice, or at least without Soviet support, had the effect of shaking Chinese confidence in the utility of their alliance with the Soviets. At this stage it would be idle to try to establish contacts with the Chinese or to undertake economic relations with them. Initiatives of this sort could even have the effect of inducing the Soviets to compete with us for Chinese favor, thus making the Soviets more militant. Such initiatives would amount to rewarding the militants and punishing the moderates in the Communist world movement. More specific steps could involve informal urgings to the Indians to request Soviet arbitration of the Chinese-Indian frontier dispute, which would inevitably embarrass all the Communist parties concerned.

If an open Sino-Soviet split does take place, then sometime later it might be advisable for the United States to consider adopting a two-China policy. It is likely that such initiatives would be rebuffed by the Chinese. But if the Sino-Soviet split were to involve mutual accusations of heresy, it is possible that Moscow might be more sympathetic to such initiatives. Any ambivalence in the Soviet reaction to our two-China policy would further aggravate Sino-Soviet conflicts. In addition, at such a point it might be advisable to encourage our allies to trade more with the Chinese in order to break down the Soviet isolation of the Chinese and to make the Chinese less susceptible to Soviet economic pressure. But even here it would be important to avoid the impression of rewarding the militants within the Communist movement. It is to be remembered that at such a juncture the Soviet leadership would be under enormous pressure to redeem its revolutionary standing, and hence it will be imperative that we not give the Soviets cause to rush ahead with risky actions.

3 – It is desirable for the United States to recognize Mongolia and to undertake official relations with it. The Soviet Union has been pledged to bring Mongolia into the international community, while the Chinese have shown a considerable lack of interest in this particular undertaking. Mongolia is a Soviet satellite, established by the Soviets some 40 years ago at the direct expense of the Chinese, and the increasing sense of Mongolian nationalism involves potential territorial claims against China, where many Mongolians reside. Recognition of Mongolia by the US as a form of accommodation with Russia would inevitably aggravate the Sino-Soviet relationship. It is to be noted that the American-Soviet arrangement in the United Nations, whereby Mongolia was admitted in return for a Soviet commitment not to veto Mauritania must already have strained Soviet-Chinese relations, since the consequence of this arrangement was that the United States gained some 20-odd French-speaking African votes against the admission of Red China. In effect, "objectively speaking" to use a Marxist category, the Soviet Union was collaborating with the US in preventing the admission of Red China into the United Nations. A US recognition of Mongolia would have a similar effect on Chinese national interests.

4 – The United States should discourage any pressure on Albania from its Yugoslav and Greek neighbors, particularly efforts to overthrow the existing Albanian regime or to partition the country. It would be a bad precedent indeed if the assertion of independence from Moscow by any Communist regime, even an extremely anti-Western one, were to be followed immediately by the fall of that regime. This would inhibit further breaking up of the Soviet bloc, which is not in our interest. As things now stand, it might even be desirable to encourage some Western countries to aid the Albanian regime.

5 – Nuclear weapons should not be given to the West German Army, since this provides Eastern European Communists with an extremely useful emotional argument for tightening links with the Soviet

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Union. Given the historical legacy of the Second World War, the West Germans should realize that it is incumbent upon them to minimize East European fears. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the West German Army would intensify such fears, thereby consolidating bloc unity.

6 – The Poles and the Czechs should be reassured about frontiers. Here, too, the West Germans could make a useful contribution by accepting existing territorial arrangements. The West Germans must realize by now that German reunification is not possible unless there is a substantial change in the relationship of East Europe and the Soviet Union. The days when the East German question could be resolved in isolation from that of East Europe are gone forever. Hence, whatever contributes to closer ties between East Europe and the Soviet Union contributes to the perpetuation of the division of Germany. Anything which weakens these ties brings unification closer. Western acceptance of the existing territorial arrangements would make Polish and Czech national security less dependent on the Soviet Army.

7 – Given the magnetic attraction which West European development has for East Europe, it would be useful to offer East European countries Western European and US aid for their economic development, based on the principle of closer European socio-economic ties. Such offers could stress that the existing socio-economic division of Europe (leaving political matters aside) is unnecessary and harmful to the interests of the peoples, and that the West is willing to aid Eastern Europe so as to close the gap between our respective standards of living. Such offers would generate a great deal of popular sympathy and might even be welcome in some of the Communist elites, provided they were voiced without political overtones. They would certainly be viewed with suspicion by the Soviet Union, and they would be bound to provoke an outraged Chinese reaction. If accepted, they would contribute to the further differentiation of the Communist world. If rejected, they would again increase East European hostility to Russia, since most East Europeans would assume that Russia was responsible for the rejection. Such offers would also create increased popular pressure on the local Communist elites for improving living standards, and would presumably lead to louder demands for Soviet help in development. Either the refusal or the acceptance of our offer would be desirable from the standpoint of the West, since it would have the effect of either tying a part of the Communist bloc to the West, or of increasing the divisive forces already at work within it. An initiative of this sort would indicate directly the West's peaceful intentions in East Europe, an area of great Communist vulnerability.

8 – The West, and particularly the United States, must increasingly address itself to the ideological and social problems which the Communist societies are facing. In discussing the future, the Communists never hesitate to offer prescriptions and guides to action. Today, the Communist world is facing a mounting ideological debate with many Communists engaging in sincere self-doubt and criticism. The dilemma which many of them face, however, is that there appears to be no alternative to their existing socio-economic and political system. The West should join in this dialogue. Western statesmen in their speeches, which increasingly penetrate the Iron Curtain, should not hesitate to discuss the problems with which the Communist societies contend – be they with agriculture or with their youth or with their political institutions – and should offer not only criticisms but constructive suggestions for improvement. These suggestions could stress the compatibility of socialism and pluralism, of national ownership and personal freedom, and should try to stimulate a dialogue concerning the future development of Communist societies.

The West has tended to abdicate discussion of the future to the Communists, and merely to restrict itself to negative criticisms of current Communist reality. Authoritative statements by Western leaders, including the President of the United States, on the future development of Communist societies, would obviously be rejected by the Communist leaders as interference in their domestic affairs, but this rejection in itself would be a reflection of their sense of insecurity and of their fear of an open dialogue with the West. It would stimulate great interest among the youth, and might have the effect of destroying the greatest domestic asset which the Communist leaders now enjoy – namely, that since they have a complete monopoly on policy making and on all sources of policy information, opposition to them, in effect, means opposition to social development and economic growth. An opponent of the Communist regime is normally without an alternative. To be against Communism is to be against everything and to stand for nothing. By opening up such a dialogue, the West could change this.

The foregoing recommendations would allow the West peacefully to promote and exploit some of the major new trends within the Communist bloc. The policy of peaceful engagement requires both firmness, based on American power, and elasticity, derived from an understanding of the changing situation in the Communist world. Some left-wing critics of American policy would abandon the element of power. The right-wing abjures elasticity. An effective policy requires both.

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THE INTERNATIONAL RICH AND POOR

The Administration opened its case for the Trade Liberalization Bill before the House Ways and Means Committee by wheeling out its biggest guns, the men in charge of profits and jobs, Secretary of Commerce Hodges and Secretary of Labor Goldberg. In the first installment of this two-part essay, which dealt with the economic aspects of the trade debate, Mr. Gass argued that it may be harder for the United States to maintain full employment in an economy in which international trade is more important than it is today. In this concluding installment he says that the probable rewards of a "partnership" with the Common Market have been exaggerated, and that the President's program needs considerable revision.

The Crusade for Trade–II

A Bold New Move Toward Europe

by Oscar Gass

When doubt is raised whether Trade Liberalization is likely to be of great economic value to the United States, as I have raised it previously, the answer comes back, almost automatically, "The President needs it for his foreign policy. Enactment of a Trade Liberalization Bill in 1962 would be a great step toward Europe."

Toward Europe or against Europe?

The reconstruction of Western Europe, after World War II, was based on four politico-military fundamentals. First was the universal understanding that the traditional struggle for European hegemony should now be declared obsolete. (This theme was perhaps caught most suggestively by Professor Ludwig Dehio in a series of essays published between 1950 and 1953, which are translated in his *Germany and World Politics*, London, 1959.) This understanding found worthy embodiment in the personalities of Adenauer and de Gaulle, and it made possible deep-reaching Franco-German reconciliation and collaboration. Second was the rejection of Communism. This was clear by 1948. Though large Communist parties retained their hold among the working classes of France and Italy, Communism would not come to power in Western Europe except as the result of Russian occupation following a war. Third, the United States would resist Russian occupation of Western Europe. Therefore any Russian aggressive move against Western Europe would certainly bring on World War III. Fourth – though this became clear only in the later 1950's – a world war would be one of intercontinental missiles delivering nuclear explosions. In such a war, the United States would be little, if any, more safe than Europe.

Crystallization of these politico-military fundamentals of the new Western Europe was greatly assisted by American economic aid. But none of these fundamentals was dependent on particular institutions of regional Western European economic cooperation. To be specific, nothing in all this was dependent – as some Americans in Washington now seem to think everything in Europe is dependent – on the Common Market. The Common Market came into business only on January 1, 1958, when these fundamentals were long established. Moreover, Great Britain, which remained out of the Common Market, gave firmer support to NATO than France, which chose to go in. Also, none of the countries who stayed out of the Common Market has as extensive trade with the Communist countries as did Germany and Italy, who were in. President de Gaulle seems to have been designed personally for the discomfiture of those who see in the Common Market a European political integration in association with the United States. The Gaullist regime continues a firm supporter of the Common Market, an unremitting enemy of all European supra-national political integration, and the most uncooperative member of NATO.

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The Common Market may be a good thing, for its members, as an economic matter. Insofar as its members become richer, they will also have the means to become stronger. The Common Market may even contribute to the quality of European society. But the institutions of the Common Market are in no way indispensable to the unity of Western European resistance to Communism. Still less indispensable is any American "partnership" with the Common Market. And the day may yet come when Americans lament bitterly that the benefits of Trade Liberalization were not sought in Europe on the road of Universalism rather than Regionalism.

Beware the Greeks bearing gifts! The Common Market countries are in no hurry to accept the new American "partner" who, in his very first tender of agreement, asks the present members to give up much of their exclusive benefits. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the Common Market countries would prefer that all such suggestions of breaching their protective wall be withheld – at least for a few years.

By 1966, on their present accelerated schedule, the four present members of the Common Market (France, Germany, Italy and Benelux) will have removed all tariffs among themselves. They will have raised a common protective wall against all other countries. Within the wall, the same protective shelter will be enjoyed by American firms who have established local factories. No interest protected by the tariff wall will wish it removed. And the value of the internal benefits will increase with each further discrimination involved in the steps toward 1966. Only 40 percent of the way has been traversed up to now.

The International Rich and Poor

To the internal beneficiaries of the Common Market discriminations, the United States now comes and says, "You are reducing your tariffs among one another to zero. Good. Count me in! And please give the same most-favored-nation treatment to all other non-Communist countries. I may propose zero tariffs where you and I account for 80 percent of all non-Communist international trade. (Of course, you and I will not add up to 80 percent very often unless the British have joined you first!) Let us also agree to bring tariffs for tropical products down to zero. In other cases, we may reduce tariffs 50 percent. But, remember please, I want a place also in your market for my farmers. And above all, on balance, I cannot afford to have you – Europe – continue to cost me as much money as you have in recent years. I must, in all ways taken together – trade, aid, military spending, investments, loans, *etc.* – receive more payments *net* from you, on balance, than I have recently. You can see the merits of my position. And I trust you will have remembrance of things past. Can the United States count on the welcoming mat being out?"

The United States can not.

Where the character of the American initiative in Trade Liberalization is more likely to be welcome is in the poorer countries. In this respect, Mr. Kennedy has consistently spoken for a very statesmanlike position, in recent months. And, in this context, the President adhered severely to the traditional American approach of Universalism in Trade Liberalization. On December 6, 1961, in a forceful speech before the National Association of Manufacturers, Mr. Kennedy said: "I am not proposing, nor is it either necessary or desirable, that we join the Common Market . . . establish a 'rich man's' trading community, abandon our traditional most-favored-nation policy, create an Atlantic free-trade area, or impair in any way our close economic ties with Canada, Japan and the rest of the free world. And this, of course, is a problem of the greatest concern to us all. We do not want Japan left out of this great market, or Latin America, which has depended so much on the European Market."

The same understanding note sounds repeatedly in the formal "Message On Trade," which the President sent to the Congress on January 25, 1962, together with his Bill on Trade Liberalization. There he says: "We must make certain that any arrangements which we make with the European Economic Community are worked out in such a fashion as to insure non-discriminatory application to all third countries . . . the United States and Europe together have a joint responsibility to all of the less-developed countries . . . we will preserve our traditional most-favored-nation principle under which any tariff concession negotiated will be generalized to our other trading partners."

The President also requested special authority to join with the Common Market in eliminating all duties on tropical products ". . . supplied by friendly less-developed countries and not produced here in any significant quantity. . . ." In this case, however, the President's generosity is perhaps not of the highest order. The United States already has on the free list such tropical products as coffee, cocoa and bananas, while several European countries subject these items to considerable tariffs, either for revenue or to protect former colonies. The President is here offering to give up someone else's cow.

Moreover, in the text itself of the draft Bill on Trade Liberalization, as submitted by the President, the great principles of concern and care for the poorer countries have only a modest place (Sec. 213 and Sec. 241). A critical case is the intent of the bill in the matter of tariff discrimination against friendly third countries. For example, in Europe there are three major trading

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nations now or prospectively in the Common Market – France, Great Britain and Benelux – who discriminate sharply against Japanese imports. (These discriminations contribute to Japan's selling twice as much to the US as to all Europe.) Does the new bill mean that the President could not lawfully conclude the special agreement with the Common Market, permitted under its Chapter 2, unless the Common Market undertook to remove these discriminations? If the bill does not mean this, are President Kennedy's statements on protecting the poorer countries only Sunday sermons? Perhaps the text of the bill should be amended to determine this issue positively.

The President regrettably does not advert to the most difficult principle in trade policy with poorer, less-developed countries. This is a principle that goes beyond formal reciprocity. If the United States and Western Europe are considerate of the development problems of the poorer countries, we will indeed open to them our markets. We will buy from them on a non-discriminatory basis, appreciating that the less-developed countries must sell us whatever their special natural resources or labor are able to supply. But the economically-advanced nations will *not* then insist on reciprocal freedom to sell in the markets of the less-developed countries. If a poor country determines that passenger automobiles costing more than $2,000 are luxuries it cannot afford to import, the advanced countries must not press for a change of policy. The less-developed countries must also be allowed to protect their weak industries – even in disregard of our judgment that these industries are often ill-advised. And also respecting the import of capital goods, a less-developed country can be indulged in the use of tariffs and import licenses to which we would rightly object in a developed country.

It is for the more advanced countries to attain the understanding of the justice which consists in treating unequals as unequals.

Tariff Policy and Legislative Control

Under the bill which Mr. Kennedy proposed, the President would be delegated authority for five years. He could "enter into trade agreements with foreign countries." He could proclaim "such continuance, reduction or elimination of any duty or other import restriction . . . as he determines to be required or appropriate to carry out such trade agreements." In general, the President would be delegated authority to reduce any duty by up to 50 percent. In special cases, of which the most important would be a general agreement with the European Common Market, he could reduce duties to zero. When he had concluded any agreement, he would be obligated only to "transmit to the Congress a copy."

In my view, this five-year delegation of power is unnecessary. There is no task to be done which requires present delegation of authority for so long as five years. In my view, further, so prolonged a delegation, where unnecessary, is not a desirable practice of government. Such delegation frees the Executive Branch from the need to respond to effective critical review, and it deprives the Congress of real, meaningful participation in the process of government.

I suggest, therefore, that the Trade Liberalization Bill would be improved greatly if its delegation of authority were made renewable after two years, rather than five. A two-year period is enough to prepare and conclude any trade negotiation, and yet it is not longer than the term of a single Congress. Properly scheduled, a two-year period would give each Congress an opportunity to review carefully what has been done, to decide where the previous act of delegation needed to be revised, and to continue whatever experience showed to be well-designed.

An additional, but more problematic, instrument of control is, I think, desirable in the case of the broad power to reduce customs duties to zero, in an agreement with the European Common Market. Such an agreement should, I suggest, lie for 60 days before both Houses of Congress, before entering into effect. And it should, in my view, become valid only if neither House took negative action during that period. A comprehensive reduction of customs duties to zero is of sufficient legislative importance to justify this deliberate and responsible mode of approval.

After this major issue of Congressional participation, the structural changes needed in the President's draft bill may be narrowed down to four.

First, in regard to controlling *purposes*. The preamble of the bill and its statement of Purposes (Sec. 102) include everything except the kitchen sink. But they omit the major objective of improving the international balance of payments of the United States. This omission is perhaps less than clear-sighted and candid. In 1962 and 1963, to look no further forward, American trade policy must operate within the controlling need to improve the United States balance of payments – not by trade policy alone but by trade policy also. The Trade Liberalization Act should set forth this balance of payments objective as one criterion, among others. And the law should instruct the President to report annually on how his actual Trade Liberalization measures were conceived to be related to this objective and on the experienced outcome.

The United States needs to keep balance of payments considerations from having undue constraining effect on the expansion of the domestic economy. This is the danger, discussed above, of allowing the tail to

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wag the dog. But we shall not succeed in avoiding constricting influences from deficits in our international balance of payments unless we deal with these deficits in our arrangements of international trade and finance.

Second, in regard to *staging requirements*. These are the provisions of law (Sec. 243) which limit the amount of decrease in customs duty that can take place in any one year. They provide the really worthwhile element of protection from the impact of the tariff reductions that would be negotiated under a Trade Liberalization program. It is therefore my suggestion that these staging requirements be strengthened. The maximum reduction in import duty might be limited, in all cases, to 5 percent of the value of the article imported per year, for the first five years. Then in cases of really high present duties, over 25 percent *ad valorem*, the remainder – the amount of duty over 25 percent – would be subject to elimination in a maximum of 5 more years.

Third, in regard to *adjustment assistance*. This comprehends the armory of "technical assistance," loans, tax reliefs and special compensations, outlined in 31 pages of the President's draft bill. I have indicated earlier why I think "adjustment assistance" is a huge mistake. I suggest this entire aspect of the bill be eliminated.

Fourth, in regard to *most favored nation treatment*. This is where the United States can take a step toward regaining its Universalist position in trade policy. This is also where we can assist the poorer countries, if we are serious about doing so. I therefore suggest that consideration be given to requiring most favored nation treatment not only as a principle of action by the United States Government (as in the present Sec. 241) but also as an engagement of the other countries with whom the United States makes agreements under the Trade Liberalization Act.

Outside the Trade Liberalization Act as such, there is the related issue of the enlargement of international monetary reserves. What is up for current consideration is the so-called $6 billion supplementary international monetary fund, which (as I have indicated in my earlier article) is really no fund at all. This issue does not come before the Congress for formal "ratification." The controlling exchange of letters between the French Minister of Finance and the US Secretary of the Treasury (dated December 15, 1961) presumably records an Executive arrangement not requiring to be ratified formally. But the United States needs to have made ready $2 billion, for our participation. Therefore the matter must come before the Congress for appropriation or for an authorization to borrow $2 billion.

The Congress of the United States would, in my view, act most responsibly if, after careful review and inquiry, it rejected this request for a $2 billion appropriation or authorization. Such rejection should be accompanied by counsel to the Executive to attempt to negotiate a more satisfactory agreement. Then this rejection would, in the long run, serve the interests of international monetary stabilization. It would also, in the long run, improve the quality of the relations between the Congress and the Executive. And it would generally contribute to improving the quality of the conduct of the public business of the United States.

The Crusade for Trade

Trade liberalization has become a Holy Cause. Decent people are prepared to lie for it. In Washington, from Capitol Hill to Georgetown and beyond, one hears the same counsel, "That may be true. But don't say it. You will be helping the protectionists." If one cannot unqualifiedly praise, then one should be silent, so that the Right and the Good may prevail.

Elsewhere, gaudier fireworks are burned. On January 31, 1962, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs gave a speech entitled "The President's Trade Program – Key to the Grand Design." The minted phrase "Grand Design" had then already been taken up by a Washington journalistic claque. (The Secretary of State had used it a month earlier in a speech before the American Historical Association. And the President had used it several times.) But we must still ask ourselves seriously: Grand Design? What design? Do we have here a genuine foreign policy reality, or is this only another piece of advertising lingo? I fear the latter is the case.

The text of the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs speech is not reassuring. He calls upon God. He invokes Peace and Freedom. But he gives no indication of awareness of what the design of a foreign policy might consist of. Concerning trade itself, he says, "Unity will ultimately depend upon the development of a real community of interests – involving all of the varied activities and aspirations of man. Trade is the warp and woof of such a community." If trade is already both "the warp and woof," what is left? (No doubt, finishing and ornamentation.) But lest we fear that we may have misunderstood the Undersecretary, he goes on, "Trade is the one most universal common denominator among the pursuits of man." Not work, not play, not love, not struggle, not search – but trade! Here we have reached the 1960's version of the wisdom of Calvin Coolidge, "The business of the United States is business." But we have 40 years of progress: the wisdom of Calvin Coolidge is now perceived to have universal application.

The problem of China? Trade. The problem of the Germanies? Trade. The problem of nuclear annihila-

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tion? Trade. No need to proceed. It is easy to see how Trade Liberalization is the key to the Grand Design of a foreign policy.

In the fullness of time, our generation too may have its understanding historian. Perhaps a Johan Huizinga, perhaps a Lucien Febvre. Why should imaginative richness and intellectual penetration be expended only on remote centuries? Even then, our historian may find this whole Trade Liberalization affair, as it is being played out in the United States, a puzzler. How could intelligent people in the America of the 1960's come to think of a question affecting some customs duties on merchandise as a great crusade? Our historian will, by definition, see deeper than we, but perhaps we can help him.

Ours is not a society rich in attractive public causes. We live in what is, in several fundamentals, a frustrated democracy. The great Aristotle defined a citizen as "a man who shares in the administration of justice and in the holding of office." By this exacting definition, we have few citizens. Indeed, perhaps the dominant characteristic of our public life is the political *nonparticipation* of the greater number of our people. But Americans are profoundly dissatisfied with this nonparticipation.

Moreover, political advocacy is now extremely timid in the United States. If there is any political impulse that holds deeper appeal for Americans it is the pull toward a more exacting reformulation of democracy. But did not the same Aristotle also say that democracy is the rule of the poor? And is it not un-American today to speak of "poor" and "rich"? Surely our polite tradition holds we are all "affluent"; rich and poor have been abolished. But, in our more reflective moments, we are nevertheless repelled by the emptiness of this polite tradition.

Politics is always a struggle for the exercise of the public power. But when politics passes beyond a chapter in zoology, it is a struggle for the exercise of the public power in the service of some conception of the good life. Whatever elements of the impulse to a politics beyond the limits of zoology have persisted in our American tradition were lulled to sleep in the prosperity of the better-placed or bludgeoned out of existence by the Cold War. You never had it so good! And, besides, will you give aid and comfort to the totalitarian enemy? But the reduction of politics to a struggle between Gog and Magog leaves us distressed.

What joy, what release, in this moral climate, to find a cause like Trade Liberalization! Here the good, the wise and the rich are come together. The great banking figures (almost to a man) are joined with the prominent names in the AFL-CIO (also almost to a man). College Presidents jostle corporate Presidents. And the assembly achieves a mood of high solemnity. Here is no trumpery business of cotton and oil, buttons and beeswax. Here is combat for the unity of free men and a hard blow struck against the Communist hydra. What a glorious festival! What a noble company!

Consequently we rejoice, having to construct *something* upon which to rejoice.

A Mote in the Mind's Eye

I would not recommend rejection of the President's initiative in Trade Liberalization. I would recommend enactment, after major structural modifications.

The contribution of the United States to world affairs would be diminished by rejection. People all over the world would probably understand rejection of Trade Liberalization to mean a movement of Congressional opinion toward international economic isolation. And they would, quite reasonably, be led to speculate on whether the Congress was not also moving in the direction of diminishing its support for American political participation in world affairs. To so withdraw would be to shirk American responsibilities. To appear to withdraw would create confusion.

It is of the first order of importance that Americans should appreciate, with all possible clarity, how little can rationally be anticipated, in domestic economic gain, from Trade Liberalization. A freer international trade is not among the more important policies of the US in relation to its domestic economic problems.

It is equally important that Americans should realize, clearly and consequently, how small is the contribution to our general foreign policy that can be made by Trade Liberalization. Nothing we can do in the sphere of customs duties will make a weighty contribution even to overcoming the major differences of outlook, in their approach to world problems, between our government and the governments of friendly non-Communist countries. Far less will anything we can do in Trade Liberalization have significant consequences in helping toward reconciliation or equilibrium where we are in conflict with the Communist bloc.

One of the more attractive aspects of the program of Trade Liberalization is the promise it holds out of assistance to the poorer peoples, through markets for them. But this promise will be realized only if the United States adheres to a firm univeralist line in our trade agreements. In the past, our government has inconsistently indulged – indeed fostered and sponsored – regional economic exclusiveness. If we are to act better in the future, we must first straighten out our thinking.

Above all, and as a prelude to all other rational conduct in this sphere, we must deflate the swollen image of Trade Liberalization to its true dimensions. *A mote it is to trouble the mind's eye.*

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If the Cubans Go Hungry

Maybe having no soap and few beans will reduce the Cuban peasants to a mood of sweet reasonableness, but if so they are remarkable creatures. Other animals, kept dirty and hungry, turn vicious, but perhaps Cuban peasants are different; such must be the assumption of our State Department, since it would be irrational for it to pursue a policy that it knows would still further envenom our relations with the Cuban people.

It is to be feared, though, that the policy-makers in the department know well enough that filth and starvation are fine means to drive any people to desperation, Cubans included, but are laying the flattering unction to their souls that they, the policy-makers, are so clever that they can control desperation, turning it in any direction that may suit their purpose.

If that is the case, one cannot give them much credit for intelligence. That policy has been tried time and again, and has always failed. The German industrialists tried it when they financed Hitler. The imperial German government tried it when they turned loose Lenin and Trotsky on tortured Russia. Many another tyrant has tried it, only to discover that while you can drive people to desperation easily enough, you cannot control the direction of the resultant explosion. It is the rule rather than the exception in such cases that the engineer is hoisted by his own petard.

But even if it worked, it would be anything but a handsome policy. Cat's-paw diplomacy never is. Even if we could, using famine and pollution as our horrible agents, drive the Cubans to madness and direct their wrath against Castro, we should be instigating the poor devils to rush with their bare hands upon Russian-made tanks and machine-guns; and we saw in Hungary what that means.

The chances are, of course, that any dragon's teeth we sow in Cuba will be harvested by us, not by Castro, all over Latin America. If the babies in Cuba go filthy and starving, the blame will be laid upon our economic blockade, not upon the villainy of Fidel; and what we lose in Havana will be trifling compared to what we shall lose in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.

It is easy to believe that Castro is playing a shrewd and cynical game. If he really tried he could probably get beans and soap enough not to have to ration either. But the point is that his game is shrewd, very shrewd. We have imposed an economic blockade, and that has laid us wide open, for all the world believes that we have the power to make it stick. If we put on the squeeze hard enough, which nobody doubts that we can do, we can send pestilence and famine stalking through Cuba; and if the Cubans' maddened by the suffering of their wives and children should obey our orders and turn on Castro, it would be a shabby victory.

The flat truth is that this character, from the very start, has been running rings around us in the field of diplomacy. Liar and scoundrel he may be, but he is no fool. Long before Kennedy came into office he had been making a monkey of Uncle Sam at every encounter. Let it never be forgotten that his troops were actually in the suburbs of Havana before our dim-wits woke up to the fact that a serious war was going on, and almost every move we have made since has been so stupid that he has neatly turned it against us. The economic blockade is only the latest of a long series of blunders.

Kennedy is Castro's target now, but Kennedy's share of the blame stems from his failure to realize how woefully mismanaged Cuban relations had been; or, perhaps, although realizing it, he felt that his hands were tied. If he had done what the situation called for he might have given ammunition to Goldwater and the John Birchites, who were already accusing all Democrats of being soft on Communism.

His fear may have been well founded. Certainly people who talk of impeaching Chief Justice Warren for believing that the Constitution means what it says would have branded any effort to treat Cuba sensibly as nothing short of high treason; and a President unwilling to risk being called a traitor does have his hands tied.

Well, we are in for it now. Castro's rationing of beans and soap is a firebrand in a powder magazine, and the job of extinguishing it is not an enviable one.

Some political commentator recently dredged up a remark by forgotten old Josiah Royce, the Harvard philosopher obliterated by William James. That remark was "Only the eternal is practical," and it has been derided endlessly. But if Kennedy in 1961 had consigned the Birchites to Tophet and done what he believed was right by Cuba, he couldn't have been worse off than he is now, and things might be better.

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Controlling or Abolishing War

by Christopher Jencks

There was a period, immediately after World War II, when American military planners assumed that the atomic bomb demanded no change in their recently acquired conceptions of "total" war. World War III would, they thought, be waged against both civilian and military forces, only with bigger and better weapons. It was only with the birth of the hydrogen bomb in 1952 that the military began to accept what scientists had been saying for nearly a decade: that we were at the end of an era, and that we must now either control war or abolish it.

The Limits of Defense
by Arthur I. Waskow
(Doubleday; $2.95)

The Limits of Defense analyzes the various schemes for controlling war which have been evolved over the past 10 years, and having concluded that none of these schemes promises the human race a substantial chance of survival, its author goes on to propose a way to abolish war altogether.

According to Waskow four different schemes for controlling war are now discussed within the government: First, there is "counterforce." This is an Air Force concept, in which the hope is held out that thermonuclear war could be waged solely against military targets, with civilians being hostages for the "reasonable" behavior of the other side. As Mr. Waskow points out, "counterforce" has at least three drawbacks: A war of this sort would still kill more people than any previous war in history, since in many cases military and civilian targets are identical or adjacent. Furthermore, the fact that military and civilian leaders have been raised in the century of total war makes it impossible for them to forget the possibility of waging such a war, and makes it probable than since no clear line can be drawn between an attack on the military and an attack on civilians, the breakdown of centralized and rationalized control over missile commanders would lead to attacks on cities. Third, while "counterforce" appears humanitarian, since it stresses the destruction of the enemy's capacity to kill you, rather than destruction of the enemy himself, the approach also raises the incentive to strike first in "self defense."

Then there is what Waskow calls "deterrence." This is the Army-Navy concept of limited war. In its more extreme version, all first strike weapons are out, the Strategic Air Command is abolished and we rely on Polaris to discourage the USSR from a nuclear attack on us. By deliberately emphasizing that any thermonuclear war would be waged against population centers, and by building missile systems such as Polaris which are useful largely for city-busting, the Army-Navy group aims to keep all fighting limited to conventional weapons. The difficulty here is that rather than lose a major conventional war, either side would probably resort to nuclear weapons, and escalation would then lead to the use of the anti-civilian "deterrent." This would mean a war even more destructive than a "counterforce" war. Another drawback is that many in the Army and Navy do not believe they can protect Western Europe from all-out Soviet conventional attack, and therefore feel that America must persuade the Soviets that even a conventional attack on Europe, like a thermonuclear attack on America, would be met by thermonuclear retaliation against Russia. This means in practice that we must be prepared to strike first, as well as second, with nuclear weapons. Once this is admitted the Air Force can make a persuasive case for a "counterforce" rather than city-busting strike. (Not only that, but the Air Force can and does argue at times that even a Soviet first-strike against the US should be met with counterforce-plus-blackmail, not city busting, since even after a Soviet first strike our primary objective would be to prevent another Soviet strike, not to kill millions of Russians.) Thus a "pure" deterrence strategy based solely on city-busting is impossible unless we can persuade our allies to turn the Common Market into the same sort of armed camp found on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Unless we do this we need not only second but first-strike nuclear capability.

The third scheme Mr. Waskow describes is "the Mix." Since neither "counterforce" nor "deterrence" alone provides certainty that civilians will not be the victims of thermonuclear attack, and since neither alone is capable of supporting all the diplomatic ventures the United States would like to undertake, the White House has adopted the policy of backing both the Army-Navy group and the Air Force, buying nearly every military system in sight on the assumption that "you never know when you might need it." By preparing to cover any Soviet bid (or raise it, if that seems desirable), the Administration hopes to prevent the Soviets from bidding at all. But suppose this hope is frustrated? Suppose a nation decides that it cannot accept terms dictated by the United States, and that "national honor," requires an attempt to get its way by force. Confronted with the "flexible" Mix, the enemy does not know what American response any given move, no matter how limited, will elicit. Will America use nuclear weapons to defend Berlin? Formosa? Korea? Being uncertain, the enemy is likely to consider the worst possibility. If the Soviets come to feel they "must" resolve the Berlin issue, for example, and if there is even a small chance this might provoke an SAC attack on Russia, they will feel compelled to knock out SAC before moving on Berlin. The "mix,"

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then, is as provocative as "counter-force," and does not even have the advantage of sparing large numbers of civilians (since it includes Polaris and other anti-civilian weapons). Furthermore an effective mix, such as that described by Herman Kahn, requires near total mobilization (*e.g.*, massive civil defense, a $75-100 billion defense budget) and hence the creation of the same kind of authoritarian, centralized regime we find so menacing abroad. We must become like the Russians to survive, but we probably won't survive anyway; this, as Mr. Waskow has suggested in another context, is a policy of "both Red and Dead"

A fourth plan is Arms Control. This approach to preventing thermonuclear attacks on civilian populations is popular in academic circles both inside and outside Washington. The main purpose of arms control would be to prevent surprise attack, accidental war, miscalculation, and so forth. Unfortunately, these efforts all depend to some extent on trust and cooperation between potential enemies. The Soviets will not abandon their secrecy and we will not abandon our flexibility (*e.g.*, by pledging ourselves not to strike first). Arms control is the antithesis of the present Kennedy-McNamara policy of "ready for anything."

Since none of the four current strategies offers any long-term security against thermonuclear attack, Mr. Waskow is left with the alternative of complete disarmament on all sides. His proposals are in many ways ingenious, particularly his devices for controlling the supervisory and police forces, and the assurances that could be offered against rearmament. Still, he does not offer any way of ordering this disorderly world; he believes in disorder. His police force would not be authorized or equipped to enforce any sort of world law, because he is convinced that neither the Soviet Union nor the US would submit to such discipline. But unless we have some legal mechanism for resolving international disputes without force (or, more often, the threat of force), it is hard to see how international disputes could be settled at all. Does Mr. Waskow believe that America has no vital stake in what happens in Laos, Vietnam, the Congo or Berlin? Or does he believe we could control events in these places by economic and social pressures? Perhaps we overestimate our stake in these areas, and perhaps if Soviet military power were abolished, America could afford to take a much more unconcerned attitude towards troubles overseas. But this seems to me a fundamentally more isolationist view of the world than has prevailed in Washington since 1941, and probably since 1916. Furthermore, if this view of what is "vital" to our national interest prevailed, the danger of thermonuclear war could be largely eliminated even without disarmament. If, for example, we were willing to accept the settlement of the Berlin crisis which we would get from the free play of social and economic pressures, (*i.e.* an Ulbricht-controlled city), there would be no danger of war no matter how many missiles we had. Similarly, if we were willing to resolve the Vietnam problem without sending in the Army, the danger of war would obviously be eliminated – although so might South Vietnam. Around the world it is safe to say that if nations were willing to submit to arbitration, to the World Court, or to the consequences of social, economic and para-military pressures, the mere existence of nuclear weapons in the background would be unlikely to produce war. But nations are not, by and large, willing to forego the threat (and therefore, when "called for," the use) of force in the conduct of either foreign or domestic policy. Somehow they convince themselves that the political or diplomatic stakes are so high that it is worthwhile to risk their own destruction to get their way – or prevent the other fellow's getting his.

Some Thoughts on the Hemingway Racket

by William White

As a collector for more than 20 years of the works of Ernest Hemingway, I discovered a few weeks ago in the book section of Detroit's largest department store, The J. L. Hudson Company, a paperback book entitled *The Secret Agent's Badge of Courage*, by Ernest Hemingway,

This title and Hemingway's name appear on the front cover, on the spine,

The Secret Agent's Badge of Courage
(Belmont; $.50)

and on the title page, as does the name of the publisher, Belmont Books. (At the bottom of the cover, in smaller print, appears the following: "The world's greatest spy stories edited by Kurt Singer with Eric Ambler, Pearl Buck, Joseph Conrad and others.")

I did not look at the book carefully until I got home, but in any circumstance I would have bought it for my Hemingway collection. I did not have the book, I had never heard of it, and although I have been reading Hemingway for years I had never heard such a title (for a short story or a book) in connection with his name.

It turns out that the 159-page book contains eight tales from *The World's Greatest Spy Stories*, edited by Kurt Singer. Although the running title at the top of every right-hand page reads "The Secret Agent's Badge of Courage," it is not until the very last page that the reader comes upon a tale by this title. It is exactly one page long and says, "by Ernest Hemingway."

One reasons that the publishers were simply cashing in on the current interest in Hemingway since his violent death in Idaho last July. But I wondered where this piece, "The Secret Agent's Badge of Courage," came from. No such title is in any Hemingway bibliography or anywhere else.

In the list of acknowledgments on page 4 is this note: "'The Secret Agent's Badge of Courage' by Ernest Hemingway from *Men at War* by Ernest Hemingway, Crown Publishers, New York." (No mention is made of permission to reprint.)

Men at War is an enormous anthology of the best war stories of all time, edited with a long introduction by Hemingway in 1942. But I could find no piece in my copy entitled "The Secret Agent's Badge of Courage." However, in searching through the book I did find two untitled paragraphs on page 428 and three untitled para-

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graphs on page 120, which the publishers (or the editor) have put together and entitled "The Secret Agent's Badge of Courage," by Ernest Hemingway. These untitled paragraphs are used as brief introductions to sections of *Men at War* called "War Is the Province of Uncertainty" and "War Is the Province of Danger, and Therefore Courage Above All Things Is the First Quality of a Warrior."

Most interesting of all, I discovered that *Men at War* contains on page xxxii the following statement: "The subtitles and quotations at the beginning of the first seven sections of this book are from *On War* by General Karl von Clausewitz: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London; E. P. Dutton & Co., New York."

Therefore, *The Secret Agent's Badge of Courage* is not a book by Ernest Hemingway, nor even a one-page essay by Hemingway; but it is actually five short paragraphs by General von Clausewitz.

One is at a loss to know who is responsible for this impudent imposture in the book market: Belmont Books, the publishers, or Kurt Singer, who has already distinguished himself with a thoroughly cheap and vulgar biography, *Hemingway: Life and Death of a Giant* (Holloway House).

"No People Needed Ever"

by Helen Hill Miller

Just as R. B. McCallum, Master of Pembroke College, Oxford, coined *cephology* as the academic name for what Mr. Dooley referred to as "followin' the illection returns" (because the Greeks used a stone – *cephos* – for a ballot), MIT's Norbert Wiener coined *cybernetics* from the Greek word for steersman, and Donald Michael has gilded the coin, forming *cybernation* to give a corresponding impressiveness to the use of automation and electronic computers.

Cybernation: The Silent Conquest
by Donald N. Michael
(Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions;
Box 4068, Santa Barbara, California)

Mr. Michael here reports on what automation is doing and what computers are thinking; projects their development – their IQ is coming up fast – and rapidly increased use over the next couple of decades; and forces attention to an acceleration of social change which will be dizzingly destructive not only of present ways of making things but of present assumptions about man and society.

The changes to which he points, moreover, will take place as our postwar population explosion reaches working age. The American labor force in the decade of the 1960's will gain some 26 million additional workers. They will either find jobs or fail to find them. If they are to find them, the US economy must expand its need for people at an average rate, boom year in and year out, by some 216,000 a month. (Employment at General Motors, over the year, runs at about 300,000.)

In the face of this oversupply of people and with increasing automation, signs reading: NO HELP WANTED TODAY are being crossed out and replaced with the information: NO PEOPLE NEEDED EVER. Recent estimates suggest that automation is currently displacing some 1.8 million workers a year from almost all sorts of jobs. Automatic ditch-diggers replace the husky but unskilled; automatic mining machinery, the husky and skilled; prefabricators and assembly lines replace the remaining craftsmen and the blue collar semi-skilled; computers replace the white collar – or more often white blouse – clerical worker. And when all these go, there is less need for foremen, supervisors, middle-management generally.

In a cybernated society, what will be needed most are sophisticated trouble-crews to repair breakdowns, and highly sophisticated top management, including professionals to improve the machines. Top management is likely to be overworked; the rest of us out of work or underworked.

If you are tempted to place this forecast on the shelf alongside More's Utopia, stop and recollect the similarity of such a reaction to what you thought when you first heard of nuclear fission.

There is no question that the sophistication of computers is growing faster than the managerial sophistication of the society which they are changing. For businessmen, they are keeping track of inventories and placing reorders as needed; for the military, they are working multiple-choice problems; in the arts, they are beginning to compose music, translate, and if their capacity to write plays is currently wasteland quality, it's improving. The epitaph of 20th Century man may be that he was able to cause changes in his environment faster than he could keep up with them.

In a society where since Adam, and especially since Adam Smith, worth – both moral and financial – and work have been closely equated, what happens to values when work dries up? Where's the dignity of labor? Where, indeed, is the laborer? When does the unemployment rate become intolerable, either to those unemployed, or to those working? How large a public relations



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job is it to transform the public image of relief checks as handouts to those who, for one reason or another, are not contributing to the economic society, into a public image of consumption payments, high in both dollar value and public esteem, as the basic support of the nation's production under the new system?

In a society where work has occupied most of the waking day, how can the Satanic component be extracted from idleness, and idleness itself converted into active leisure? As oncoming generations are brought up to consume as intensively as their parents produced – for economically speaking, meditation is not consumption – will future public works programs include widening the Inland Waterway so that SuperChris-Crafts pass three abreast?

On what basis of selection will the top managers, the Ones who Work, secure their posts? Will they be envied as masters or patronized as the Georges whom the consumers let do it? With more and more decisions made as a result of computer processing, and with major components of the information fed into the machines removed from the public domain by security classification, will public policy-making be increasingly pre-empted by the Q clearance of the professional elite?

Such questions move readily into the ridiculous. Before so privileged an elite took over the country, a silver-tongued orator would inquire of American citizens whether they proposed to be crucified on a computer matrix; and unlike his prototype, this Presidential candidate would not run in vain. It is well to remember that when, in 17th Century England, the commercial revolution put a lower value on people than on sheep, there were riots against the enclosures; it is also well to remember that the enclosures were not halted by the riots. The reason that the people and the sheep then found, if painfully, a means of coexistence is also apposite to the present study. The commercial revolution occurred as part of an age of geographic discovery. Mr. Michael's model of a cybernated society is uncluttered by surroundings. Yet the rest of the world, either as a place where human skills continue to be needed or an area of rising expectations pressing in upon the wealthy and idle, will have something to do with what happens in the United States.

MOVIES

Torment and Time

Gray, ranging from the pearliest shade to the edge of black, is the tonality of Ingmar Bergman's new film *Through A Glass Darkly*. A bare, ruined choir of an island in the Baltic; a few stone cottages; a few trees; an old hulk of a fishing boat; marsh and naked field. The light and the milieu are cleansed to the point of abstraction, like simplistic modern architecture.

Through A Glass Darkly (Janus)
Last Year at Marienbad (Astor)

On this small island is the summer home of a novelist, whom we see with his adolescent son, his married daughter, and her doctor-husband. The daughter has recently been released from a mental hospital where she was treated for schizophrenia. In the course of the film's 24 hours, she discovers that her father and husband know her case is hopeless; we see her disintegrate in a series of violent attacks. During one fit, she seizes her brother who, she knows, is in the throes of adolescent libido and commits incest. At the end of the film, accompanied by her husband, she is en route by helicopter-ambulance to a hospital, presumably permanently. The father and son, left together, have their first moment of full communion.

These are the only four people we see. The helicopter pilot is only a knock on the door. Bergman thinks of the film as a "chamber" piece.

The trouble with this quartet is that its themes are undefined and its resolution unconnected with them. The father is an egotist, more interested in his writing than his family, to whom even the daughter's illness holds horrible promise as material for his art. But the results of his egotism are not explicitly dramatized. The son does not seem an especially deprived child; his unhappiness is not much more than that of any sensitive adolescent, adored or otherwise. Although the daughter must be affected by the father's central coldness, we cannot believe it is the cause of her trouble. In daily discourse he is affectionate enough; besides, she is enfolded in the perfect love of her husband. Are we to understand that the father's egocentricity is the dynamic of the situation (as it was in *Wild Strawberries*)? Then why does the film concentrate on the daughter's anguish and hallucination and make the father's story quite secondary? In fact, the father is going through a hell of his own, deriving from a middle-age crisis in morale, and it would be perfectly just to accuse the others of lack of sympathy on *their* part.

In the last scene, where the boy is left shattered and baseless, he asks his father whether there is any reality in life. The father's answer is love – either the giving or receiving of it, its loyalty or treachery, but love as the one foundation of reality. This has a faintly Chayefskyan ring until we realize that, as the title indicates, the answer derives from St. Paul's trio of graces. *The New English Bible* renders the "greatest of these" not as Charity but as Love, and if we read it as more closely connected with *caritas* than *amor*, it may indeed be the foundation of reality. But we are still left wondering how the father arrived at that belief through the progress of the film or, if it was always in him, what use it was to him if it had so little application in his life.

Unlike Antonioni, who has turned his back on formal dramatic structure, Bergman gives us the feeling that he seeks a relatively formal structure and in some measure fumbles it. This new film is a Strindbergian study in mental torment and non-communication at close range, but without the unity and cumulation it leads us to expect. The result is a collection of gripping scenes, always carrying an underlying sense of breast-to-breast confrontation with Jacob's angel, but no clear contest, no decision.

It is almost superfluous to note that the film is beautifully made: visually

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exquisite, ingeniously knit. Harriet Andersson's performance of the deranged girl, is stark, beleaguered, volatile; she seems at the end virtually to exude an odor of unhealth and agony. Gunnar Bjornstrand, her father, adds to the glacial element of the son in *Wild Strawberries* a *malaise* that gives the novelist greater richness and makes the cold elements themselves more affecting. Max von Sydow shows further versatility as the patient husband. Even in the way he runs he delineates character – as unlike the Knight in *The Seventh Seal* as are the two centuries. Lars Passgard, the son, is adequate.

After all, however, it is the visual and emotional tonality we remember, not the theme. For the eye and for the spirit, it is a study in varying shades of gray.

I am something of a traditionalist, I suppose, and when I saw *Last Year at Marienbad*, it warmed my conservative heart. "Here," I thought, "is respect for tradition. Here is a welcome return to the principles of the free French film of the twenties – Delluc, Dulac, Jean Epstein, early René Clair, Cocteau. How pleasant to see a proper regard for the past in young folks." Imagine my surprise to find Alain Resnais, the director, being hailed everywhere as an innovator, a daring experimentalist, an *avant-gardien*. Were all these reviews and articles one huge typographical error? I felt relieved when I read that Resnais made no such claim to be an innovator and declared his debt to predecessors including D. W. Griffith.

In his new film a man and a woman meet at a *luxe* hotel – a converted palace. The man claims that they met and loved a year before at a similar place, possibly Marienbad. She denies it. She is accompanied by a man who may possibly be her husband. The lover keeps recalling scenes that possibly happened a year ago. He asks, as he says he asked before, that she go away with him; at the end she possibly does so.

The amorphousness of the story is part of the method. It was written by Alain Robbe-Grillet, whose "anti-novels" are almost as amorphous and which swirl back and forth from past to present. Resnais has adapted this time-flow to his film, making it even more intensely subjective. It is mainly narrated by the lover and is seen through his eyes, with many cinematic devices – swift intercutting, repetition of scenes in different lights, swift sequences of still shots, Méliesque fantasy, and much more – all employed to reproduce the lightning-play of intelligence, memory, association. Obviously Resnais and Robbe-Grillet are not attempting to tell a story; they want to reproduce the action of the mind.

It is very interesting. It is not very moving. No characters are created; the actors, by and large, merely pose – as photographic and symbolic elements. The technique becomes the end instead of the means. We find ourselves saying, "Yes, that is remarkably like the way the conscious and subconscious gambol and struggle with each other," but of the effect of that gambol and struggle, we feel little.

Still there is no reason why all motion pictures must be alike or achieve the same results. There is plenty of room for one like this, which provides a stimulating hour and a half. And it is good to see that someone (French, of course) has revived some of the film's oldest and most respectable techniques.

Stanley Kauffmann

ART

The Marin Retrospective Show

In the annals of revolutionary modern painting, American division, the accreditation, up to about the year 1945, depends upon an artist's having been a bridge between the Old World and the New, bringing to America what he learned in Europe and spreading the gospel here of what went on there. After 1945 accreditation depends on being non-European and originally American, by which is meant, among other things, being Japanese to some degree. By these changing standards, John Marin missed the boat. He began doing original, non-European painting in about 1903, when it didn't count; and in 1945 he was seventy-five, with eight years left to live, and he just kept on doing what he had been doing right along.

All the same, there is good reason to class him as a revolutionist of sorts. This is made clear in the superb retrospective exhibition recently opened at Washington's Corcoran Gallery of Art and due May 9 at Manchester, New Hampshire, at the Currier Gallery, whose director, Charles E. Buckley, assembled the show.

"Breakthrough" is the magic word in today's art, so much so that you can read half a catalogue preface without finding out whether the point of origin is the Museum of Modern Art or Cape Canaveral. Unlike rocketry, painting can and does have breakthroughs every week which have no conceivable relationship to results. Marin made his breakthroughs early in the century; they were directly and intimately connected with everything he painted thereafter; they were important not because no one had ever thought of them before, but because they served the artist in his dedicated purpose of getting the face – and the strength – of nature onto paper and canvas. Ultimately Marin's breakthrough was not so much a new way of handling paint – though of course it was that too – as it was a new way of seeing the world while painting pictures of what you see.

There's an enormous difference between the two kinds of breakthrough. Every significant change in painting of the last 600 years has been of the second kind and the people making the change weren't so much concerned about breakthroughs as they were

"With the appointment *of a 'cultural coordinator', to operate directly from the White House, a step has been taken toward the bureaucratization of art in America; and the bureaucratic process, by its very nature, makes for a flavorless, computer-type world. If it had been up to a bureaucrat, depend on it, they never would have hired Michelangelo to paint that Sistine ceiling. His politics were wrong, and, besides, he failed to make the lowest bid.*"

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about what they saw newly in the world and could newly show to others in paint.

What Marin saw was the fierce energy of nature. The show has a large number of brilliant seascapes, orchards and mountains in which water, trees and looming granite all seem on the point of dissolving into impassioned movement. The temptation to see Marin's somewhat junior contemporary, Albert Einstein, measuring the movement that Marin was painting is very great indeed. The young patent examiner must have been formulating his first statement of energy and mass at about the time the earliest group of oils in the show were painted, the "Weehawken Sequence" of 1903.

But the temptation should be resisted. Marin was neither a scientific painter nor a reflection in art of the new physics. We don't need to know about Einstein at all to grasp the sweep of natural energy that Marin saw in wave and mountain, and the response in artistic energy that vision released. Marin was a landscape painter first and foremost. His landscape, like yours and Einstein's, happened to be a 20th Century landscape, but essentially he is asking you to look at things and love them.

His landscape included the city. He grew up across the river when Weehawken was still a pleasant, half rural suburb, New York made a great impression on him and oddly, at first, the impression seems to be much the same as that of the Maine coast on a windy day. The Woolworth Building and the Municipal Building thrust toward the sky not as girder placed upon girder but as a natural force rooted in the rock of Manhattan and climbing toward the sun. The straight but rarely quite vertical lines shoot upward, like trees; spots of color appear, as windows, as sky signs, perhaps as blossoms. At the base the jam of excavation for new construction provides a jungle of shorter lines and darker tones, a root system for this marvelous growth. The two worlds come together in a subject Marin painted often, the Brooklyn Bridge. In a "Fantasy" on that theme, the painter rearranged the elements so that one of the double Gothic piers, along with strategically located cables and buildings all appear to be afloat on the East River. The river itself is all over the picture, surging to meet the sky and holding up to the sky its cargo of man's works.

The bringing of nature and man together works the other way as well. We think of Marin primarily as a marine painter, creator of hundreds of exuberant water colors of the way it is between Maine and the ocean. But in even the wildest waves of Marin's sea – and even the calm days seem pretty blowy with whitecaps and windlines and air itself made visible in violent motion – man is there. Along the bottom, almost lost, perhaps, in the turmoil, there is a shore line or a windowsill; faintly seen at one side, there is a jutting headland. And more often than not, at least in one's memory of the show, the sea itself is calmly traversed by a ship in sail.

Movement is everywhere, in the painting process as in the scene depicted. Short, sharp strokes in flurries and flutters come together to make the sea in flow. In the water colors the white of the paper is played upon as fully as the paint. The paper becomes a second brush, springing into life generated by the paint stroke nearby. The technique in oil, while not simply oil used as if it were water color, is certainly inconceivable to a painter without Marin's total command of the lighter medium. The strokes stand for themselves, unblended save by the eye; canvas is left untouched if anything added would take away from what was first put down.

From these fusions of the process of painting with the caught up vision of the lively world came better than a dozen late works in the show, all done when Marin was past eighty. Now, at last, the eyes move inland with the same depth they always found in looking out to sea. Mountains glisten in a spotty covering of autumn foliage. Apple blossoms start out from black tree forms like bursts of fire. The world is in flux and the marvel is not the flux but the eye and the hand that stay the flux and yet let it go on.

FRANK GETLEIN

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

William White *is a professor of journalism at Wayne State University.* Helen Hill Miller *is the author of a new book,* Greek Horizons.

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RECORDS

The Real Article

The director of a production of *Romeo and Juliet* feels free to cut the text but wouldn't think of changing it; and no one would publish anything but what Shakespeare wrote. But Rimski-Korsakov felt free to change the melody, harmony, rhythm and phrase-structure of Musorgski's *Boris Godunov;* his falsification was for years the only published and produced version the public knew, and still is the version most of the world hears today, thirty years after the publication of the Musorgski original; as for this country, the Metropolitan, after giving the original a few seasons, last year substituted another falsification by Shostakovich.

And many other works are known to the public only in the altered forms they are given in "editions." It is only recently that we have had a few recorded performances of Handel's *Messiah* that have used the original orchestration without the additions of Mozart and others. And only now do we get, on Epic LC-3817 (mono) and BC-1152 (stereo), the first recorded performance of the real Boccherini Cello Concerto in B flat in place of the Gruetzmacher "edition" we have heard until now, which in fact was a work Gruetzmacher himself composed with thematic material of the unpublished real concerto and other published concertos of Boccherini, and which cellists have continued to play for some fifteen years after the publication of the Eulenburg score of the real Concerto in B flat. In addition the Epic records give us the first recorded performance since Feuermann's of the original Haydn Cello Concerto in D in place of the reorchestrated and cut "edition" of Gevaert that cellists still play. The Boccherini, true enough, turns out to be a rather unimpressive product of the mind that operates in individual and fascinating fashion in the quintets on Angel 45006/7/8/9, the quartet on Bartok 911; and the Haydn, though better than the Boccherini, is not one of Haydn's important works. But the people who want to hear them should hear what their composers wrote; and the records make this possible. They also offer good performances by Maurice Gendron with the Lamoureux Orchestra under Casals, in which I question only the tempo that is much too slow for the Andantino grazioso second movement of the Boccherini, and the failure to fill in chords above the bare bass-line at a few other points in that work.

Accuracy, with 18th Century choral works, has included reduction of the huge choral and instrumental groups of 20th Century performances to a size nearer the original; and RCA Victor LM- and LSC-6157 offer a performance of Bach's B-minor Mass in which Robert Shaw conducts a chorus of 33, a solo group of five – Saramae Endich, Adele Addison, Florence Kopleff, Mallory Walker and Ara Berberian – and an orchestra of 29, achieving remarkable clarity of texture in addition to the tonal beauty. It is in all ways a satisfying performance, in which a few details are puzzling: the imbalance that converts the *Qui tollis* into a flute solo with chorus obbligato; the introduction of words from *Et incarnatus est* into *Et in unum Dominum;* the substitution of flute for violin in the *Benedictus.*

Some may find Josquin des Prés' *Missa Hercules Dux Ferrariae* and the other pieces on Vanguard BG-620 and BGS-5042 more interesting than I do; and for them I report that the music is performed beautifully by the Vienna Chamber Choir and an instrumental group under Gillesberger.

And Cherubini's lovely Requiem, on Capitol P- and SP-8570, is sung well by the Roger Wagner Chorale in a performance with the Royal Philharmonic that proceeds very much like Toscanini's, except in the *Sanctus,* which is more animated and effective in his performance.

The surpise of Angel 35882 and S-35882 is not only that they offer Maria Callas in arias from French operas of varying worth, by composers ranging from Gluck to Charpentier, but that she sings arias from *Orphée et Eurydice, Carmen* and *Samson et Delila* that are usually sung by a mezzo-soprano or contralto. But Callas' lower voice has always been special in its strange timbre that is so affecting and compelling; and even with much of its bloom gone her singing of these arias is dramatically powerful, in addition to being free of the unpleasantly wobbly and shrill high notes that one hears in the soprano arias from *Alceste, Romeo et Juliette, Mignon, Le Cid* and *Louise.* Prêtre conducts the National Orchestra of the French Radio effectively.

Eileen Farrell's voice has a luster that Richard Tucker's lacks; and her occasional quiet singing in the duets from Verdi's *Simon Boccanegra, Don Carlo, Un Ballo in Maschera, Aida* and *Otello* on Columbia ML-5696 and MS-6296 is beautifully phrased and lovely in sound. But both singers indulge in dramatic explosiveness that chops up phrases and makes Farrell's voice tremulous and her high notes strident; and the performances with a recording orchestra under Fausto Cleva echo excessively in vast spaces.

Artur Rubinstein acquired his enor-

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mous popularity in this country with playing that became increasingly flamboyant; and his playing of Chopin in particular, which had had a sensitiveness and elegance in its traditional rubato style, became exaggeratedly impassioned and mannered. It was an agreeable surprise, therefore, to hear the greater continence of the performances of the Sonatas Opp. 35 and 58 that I reported on recently; but even these didn't prepare one for the relaxed, poised grace, the refinement and subtlety, the plastic coherence of Rubinstein's playing in Chopin's Concerto No. 1 on Victor LM- and LSC-2575. Nor is it only the musician who amazes one with his shaping of melodic phrase, but the pianist who does so with the loveliness of the tone, the exactness of its fine gradations in that shaping – to say nothing of the clarity and accuracy of rapid passage-work. And a good orchestral context is provided by the New Symphony of London under Skrowaczewski.

Among the flamboyant Rubinstein performances were those of Chopin's Polonaises; and I am glad to report that the straightforward and effective performances of these pieces by the excellent pianist Grant Johannesen have been reissued on Vox VUX-2003 (mono).

B. H. HAGGIN

Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

Hammering at the Farmers

Sirs:

In reply to your further "Hammering at the Farmers" on February 26, *The New Republic* could hardly be more wrong. You are right in criticizing the present farm program. Indeed it has been a ghastly failure for taxpayers, farmers and anyone with a sense of economic justice. But certainly it has not been a failure because farm prices have been kept too high or because "inefficient farmers" have been persuaded to stay on the farm.

The facts are clear. Low farm prices do not chase farmers off the farm. It is the availability of jobs *off* the farm that pull them out of farming. For example, 1933, a year of catastrophically low farm prices, saw an actual gain in the farm population. The years 1951 and 1952 (during the Korean War) – when farm prices were relatively very high – saw the biggest exodus of farmers from farming in many years.

Even in the best, high farm price years, farm income is less than two-thirds of income off the farm. In my own Wisconsin, farmers invest an average of $40,000 to $50,000 per farm and like other farmers have vastly increased their efficiency; but the Department of Agriculture studies show that if we allow them a 4 percent return on their invested capital they receive less than 40 cents an hour for the work they and their family do on the farm. Department statistics show that even the 40 percent of farmers who are most prosperous earn an income far below comparable non-farm work.

Most perverse of all, this low farm income is in the face of the most spectacular increase in efficiency the American economy has enjoyed anywhere. The President's Economic Report discloses that farm efficiency has increased three times as rapidly in the past 15 years as efficiency off the farm!

And the whole nation has benefited. Ten years ago Americans spent 26 percent of their income on food, last year only 20 percent. Last year the cost of living remained almost stable, although every element in it increased with the single exception of food. Farm efficiency cut food prices sufficiently to stabilize the cost of living to the 90 percent of the American people who live off the farm. Last year factory wage earners enjoyed an average 7 percent increase in wages. Their efficiency increased far less. But their standard of living shot up almost the full 7 percent – no inflation – because of the farmer.

The heart of the farm problem is that the farmer has not been able to share in this marvelous growth which he has spectacularly contributed to America, because he almost alone in the economy has no real control – or bargaining power – over what he produces.

William Proxmire
The Senate
Washington, D. C.

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In reply . . .

Contrary to Senator Proxmire's statement, more farmers have stayed on the farm when more off-farm jobs were to be had in the periods covered by the two recent Censuses of Agriculture. The latest farm census (1959) showed that farm numbers declined more rapidly in the preceding five years than in any similar period since 1870. At the same time the average rate of employment for the nation as a whole was 95 percent. But in the immediately preceding five-year period, employment was higher (96.4 percent, or substantially full employment by any criterion) and *fewer* marginal farmers took advantage of the additional job opportunities.

Another point worth noting is that the recent record-breaking decline in farm numbers did not appreciably affect commercial farmers. The actual rate of attrition among them was only about one third of one percent per annum. It would appear, consequently, that while commercial farmers' business may be worse now than it was in some previous period, their situation is unsatisfactory rather than desperate. There is indeed more than a normal amount of grief in dairy farming (a Wisconsin specialty) at the present time. But what is responsible? Two ill-advised hikes in the government-supported price for milk in recent months have resulted in such overproduction that support prices will have to be cut back sharply this year. There are too many dairy farmers for them all to do well. THE EDITORS

Civil Defense and Fallout Shelters

Sirs:

I would like to review the reasoning of Morton Halperin's article, "Civil Defense and Fallout Shelters" (February 26). Halperin asserts that "in order to make a case for fallout shelters it is not necessary to guarantee that the Soviets will not bomb American cities. It is sufficient to point out that they may well have strong motives to avoid cities and that it is at least possible that the war would be fought in this way." *If* a war were fought in this way, Halperin argues, the present CD program might save lives and aid recovery because the major danger to most urban areas would be fallout, not fire, blast, or heat.

Halperin never clearly indicates whether he believes such a "limited" war leaving out cities, is likely, or merely conceivable. Since he fails to defend the idea that it is likely, I would like to contest his claim that such a war is possible, and that such a possibility justifies the present CD program.

Won't the level of violence be escalated especially if neither side gains a decisive advantage after the first blows are struck? I urge Mr. Halperin to consider that any individuals who initiate a thermonuclear war, regardless how limited, are also likely to carry it to its fullest and bitterest end. In short, is there any reason to consider as possible the "limited" war Mr. Halperin pictures, other than because he can conceive of it? He emphasizes the *possibility* of a very limited nuclear exchange because it is only in such a situation that his argument makes any sense, but he ignores the *probability* of unlimited warfare.

He completely discounts the possibility that civil defense can persuade people that nuclear war is acceptable, and that this might influence US strategy in a more belligerent direction.

Halperin dismisses those fears generated by military, CD and other officials who have linked fallout shelters to our first-strike credibility. He dismisses them on the grounds that the present program is not "part of an effort to be in a position to launch a first strike." Quite true! But how little comfort this is. As James Reston pointed out in *The New York Times* (February 28), Kennedy's appeal for family shelters was made not "because anybody here believed the shelters would deal effectively with any war situation over Berlin, but primarily as propaganda devices to indicate that the United States was determined to defend the rights over Berlin." Halperin, it appears, places so much faith in the "rationality" of the Kennedy administration that he refuses to see the obvious implications of the shelter program in terms of increasing the credibility and acceptability of nuclear war.

Lewis Lipsitz
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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